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1 Introduction
Leading central bankers recently focused extensively on the monetary policy implications of such
considerations as insurance, redistribution and inequality so much so that the last two Chairs of
the Federal Reserve, the President and other board members of the European Central Bank dedicated
entire speeches to the issue and explicitly called for more research on it: Bernanke (2007, 2015); Yellen
(2014); Draghi (2016); Curé (2012); Mersch (2014).
The aftermath of the 2008 nancial crisis and the ensuing Great Recession also saw an unprece-
dented liquidity expansion: to take one example, the year-on-year growth rate of M1 quadrupled
(from 2.5 to 11 percent on average) in the post-crisis period as compared to the 2000-2008 interval;
Figure 1 illustrates this, along with nominal GDP growth.1 And among possible responses to the
crisis, helicopter drops (HD) returned to the policy debate as an actual policy option.2
Yet a framework for the analysis of optimal monetary policy when all of the aforementioned issues
matter (the implications of insurance, or inequality, over the cycle, its link with liquidity provision,
and the means to provide that liquidity) is hitherto lacking. This is what this paper does: in a model
where aggregate demand depends on liquidity, we identify a novel channel that we label the liquidity-
insurance motive of optimal policy. This changes the standard stabilization objectives (of ination
and real activity): quantitatively, it implies signicant optimal deviations from price stability in
response to shocks that in standard sticky-price models generate no such trade-o¤.
Our goal is to contribute to the understanding of optimal monetary policy in a model that belongs
to a new synthesis that is under way at the time of our writing. A very recent quantitative literature
that we review below analyzes monetary policy transmission in incomplete-market, heterogeneous-
agent New Keynesian models abbreviated "HANK" by Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2014). These
contributions can speak to empirical ndings documenting the link between expansionary monetary
policy and redistribution,3 and are also consistent with recent microeconometric evidence on the
1Since nominal GDP has actually fallen during the crisis and growth thereafter does not nearly match money
growth, it follows that velocity sank during the crisis and kept falling. The picture is even more extreme when
considering base money, whose growth rate during the three QE episodes is o¤ the charts: above 100 percent in the
crisis and its aftermath (for over a year), and around 40 percent in late 2011 and late 2013 episodes respectively.
2Much confusion surrounds this notion; we hope that our paper adds, as a side e¤ect, to the clarication one
scope of academic literature on policy-relevant topics. "Helicopter drops" were proposed by Friedman (1969), although
he in fact attributes the idea to Haberler (1952) and provides the following quote "Suppose the quantity of money is
increased by tax reductions or government transfer payments, and the resulting decit is nanced by borrowing from
the central bank or simply printing money". Notice that there is an inherent scal dimension to this that is stated
very clearly, as it is in Wallace (1981, p. 267): "unbacked government liabilities, liabilities that I call at money".
Leeper (1991) and Woodford (1996) among others provide more modern treatments on scal-monetary interactions.
3A general and robust conclusion of several papers (using a variety of methods and data sets) seems to be that
looser monetary policy is associated with less inequality (e.g. through the redistribution e¤ects of ination). Starting
from Doepke and Schneider (2006), these include i.a. Adam and Zhu (2014), Coibion, Gorodnichenko, Kueng, and
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heterogeneity of marginal propensities to consume MPCs, its relation to liquidity constraints, and
income and wealth distributions.4
We build a tractable general equilibrium model that belongs to this vintage, in order to revisit
standard New Keynesian optimal monetary policy analysis. In our model, heterogeneous households
are subject to liquidity constraints, and liquidity is used to self-insure against uninsurable risk:
nancial markets are incomplete as in Bewley, and participation is limited (infrequent) in the Baumol-
Tobin tradition. In equilibrium, aggregate demand depends on liquidity, which we dene as the
nominal asset used by households to self-insure; we call it "money", but it can be any asset whose
return is a¤ected by monetary policy.5 Liquidity is thus used in equilibrium as long as there is a
need for insurance, or inequality understood following the Bewely-Huggett-Aiyagari (heterogeneous-
agent) literature as the endogenous outcome of uninsurable shocks combined with householdsability
to self-insure.6 We thus focus on the notion of liquidity that has a long tradition, going back at least
to Friedmans (1969) analysis of the redistributive e¤ect of monetary policy and to Bewleys (1983)
formalization of that analysis.
Like many others, we consider that monetary policy is the relevant tool at business cycle (quar-
terly) frequency to improve the distorted market outcome. Thus, we analyze the residual trade-o¤s
for monetary policy after the (imperfect) use of any scal tools (without considering time-varying
scal tools as a policy instrument). But we do let scal policy do much in our model: in the baseline,
it takes care of the monopolistic distortion by sales subsidies, which it nances by an implicit redis-
tribution of prot income. Indeed, liquidity is an equilibrium phenomenon in our economy precisely
because imperfect insurance subsists (scal policy does not undo inequality perfectly); the amount
of liquidity demanded is thus an indirect metric of the insurance job left undone by scal policy. We
in fact calibrate the degree of imperfect insurance in the model which as we shall see is the main
determinant of optimal ination to match one plausible data counterpart of this object: the fall in
consumption at unemployment, which takes into account any scal transfers.7
Silvia (2013), Adam and Tzamourani (2016), Deutsche Bundesbank (2016), and Furceri, Loungani, and Zdzienicka
(2016).
4Recent empirical evidence using micro data from various sources supports the hypothesis that high MPCs corre-
spond to households who are liquidity constrained (rather than, say, income-poor); see Kaplan and Violante (2014),
Cloyne et al (2016), Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014), Gorea and Midrigan (2015), Misra and Surico (2014) and Surico
and Trezzi (2016).
5Our framework can hence accomodate nominal bonds, if they are used to self-insure and thus have a liquidity
premium. See also the discussion of alternative choices to model liquidity in Section 2.1.
6Admittedly, by focusing on short-run business cycles and stabilization policy, our framework does not capture
other important aspects of inequality, such as human capital accumulation, inequality along the age-dimension, and
others some of which operate in the richer models reviewed below. See Krueger, Mitman and Perri (2017) for a
recent contribution and review of what is now a vast literature.
7Note that this is the standard in monetary policy analysis: even in the baseline, textbook NK model, if the
scal authority had enough lump-sum instruments and the ability to use them at quarterly frequency, any cost-push
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We study Ramsey-optimal monetary policy in this framework, and unveil a to the best of our
knowledge novel channel that we call the liquidity-insurance motive, for short: with imperfect in-
surance (inequality) there is a rationale for providing liquidity, whose inationary consequencescosts
are generically dominated by its insurance benets. In other words, the trade-o¤ faced by a central
bank changes: providing insurance through liquidity is consistent with its standard objectives of sta-
bilizing ination and aggregate demand but our novel channel implies that ination stabilization
take a back seat.
We illustrate this analytically by providing a second-order approximation to the aggregate welfare
function à la Woodford (2003, Ch. 6). There is scope for a planner to provide consumption insurance,
an objective that is costly to achieve through ination when prices are sticky (and absent a full set
of scal instruments). This trade-o¤ operates in the long-run, as in any monetary model, making
deation optimal by shrinking liquidity (as prescribed by the Friedman rule and its incomplete-
market variants). But more importantly, and unlike other monetary sticky-price frameworks, the
trade-o¤ also operates in the short run in response to shocks: insofar as there is long-run inequality
making the liquidity-insurance motive operative, optimal policy requires volatile ination. What
is more, this ination volatility matters for welfare: a central bank that stabilizes ination, albeit
around an optimal long-run target, incurs a large welfare cost consumers would pay (around 0.1
to 0.5 percent of consumption) to live in the economy with volatile ination. Such deviations and
welfare e¤ects are larger than those encountered in existing monetary models with nominal rigidities.
Ination volatility is benecial in our economy because it dampens the consumption volatility of
constrained households without much a¤ecting the unconstrained, who can self-insure. The optimal
policy consists of providing liquidity, which insures the constrained, and inating away some of its
value, in order to give the unconstrained the right intertemporal incentives to hold this liquidity for
precautionary purposes.
Since the optimal policy consists of providing liquidity to insure in face of aggregate shocks, it is
only natural that more direct ways of injecting this liquidity (such as helicopter drops HD) are prefer-
able to indirect ways (such as open market operations OM). The former consist of injecting liquidity
during the period so that it reaches all households, but hence also most importantly constrained
ones, with unit marginal propensity to consume. While the latter (OM) consists of exchanging liquid-
ity for other assets and transferring the proceeds only later through the consolidated budget thus
depriving the central bank of a within-the-period transfer. In the latter case, optimal policy thus
needs to rely more on the Pigou e¤ect, or on a distortionary tax: using (costly) ination to inuence
the value of real balances of constrained households.8 We provide a rigorous welfare comparison of
type shocks could be accommodated through variations in, e.g., labor-tax rates or sale subsidies thus redistributing
from rms to consumers. Similarly, the zero lower bound could be avoided by appropriate saving taxes (consumption
subsidies). Standard analysis assumes that such perfect redistribution is unfeasible, which is what we also assume.
8The two means of money creation are equivalent for welfare when prices are exible (and ination is like a
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the two policy arrangements by calculating Ramsey-optimal policy for each and nd that, for a same
change in government liabilities, implementing optimal policy through HD is preferable to the most
favorable OM (whereby liquidity is transferred to households after one period only).
1.1 Related Literature
Our paper is related to several literatures. The model (that we then use for studying optimal policy)
integrates two streams of monetary economics that evolved divergently over the past two decades:
New Keynesian (NK) models with nominal rigidities, and microfounded models of money demand
with exible prices.9 Within these frameworks, we connect their two subsets that focus on hetero-
geneity, market incompleteness and limited participation. One stream consists of monetary theory
models with limited participation and incomplete markets in the Bewley and Baumol-Tobin
tradition. In our model, money is used to self-insure against idiosyncratic shocks as in Bewley
models, but only for non-participating agents as in the Baumol-Tobin literature. Some of the key
contributions, all with exible prices, include Bewley (1983); Scheinkman and Weiss (1986); Lucas,
(1990); Kehoe, Levine, and Woodford (1992); Algan, Challe, and Ragot (2010); Alvarez and Lippi
(2014); Khan and Thomas (2015); Cao et al (2016); Lippi, Ragni and Trachter (2015); Gottlieb
(2015); Rocheteau, Weill and Wong (2015, 2016); and Ragot (2016).10 Drawing on this literature,
two assumptions are key to deliver our models tractability. First, households participating in nan-
cial markets have a high income and join a family where risk is pooled an extension of Lucas (1990),
also used more recently by i.a. Challe et al. (2017). Second, a family head chooses the allocations of
all households (including those not participating in nancial markets who have a low income), under
liquidity contraints. In the equilibrium that we focus on, non-participating households consume all
their liquid wealth, and there are only two wealth states instead of a whole distribution of wealth
as in a fully-edged Bewley model. This delivers Euler equations that preserve self-insurance (here,
through liquidity or money demand), while capturing heterogeneity in a simplied manner.
The other stream of literature studies heterogeneous agents in NK models; an early, 2000s
literature introduced "hand-to-mouth" consumers (or limited participation in asset markets) to study
aggregate demand and monetary policy one could call this "rst-generation HANK". Galí, Lopez-
Salido and Valles (2007) and Bilbiie (2008) are two early examples of such models, where a subset of
agents are (employed) hand-to-mouth and have unit MPC.11 Compared to these models, we allow for
non-distortionary tax): they just deliver di¤erent ination and money balances paths, for a same real allocation.
9Money demand in the NK model is generically residual when money is introduced in the utility function, through
a cash-in-advance constraint, or through shopping-time distortions. This has nevertheless important consequences for
optimal policy, which we review in due course.
10Recent empirical work argues that such frictions are needed to explain money demand, including the distribution
of money holdings across agents (i.a. Alvarez and Lippi 2009; Cao et al 2012; Ragot 2014).
11Gali et al (2004, 2007) distinguish households according to whether they hold physical capital or not and solve
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temporarily-binding credit constraints and allow constrained agents to self-insure. So do some of the
more recent, 2010s-vintage models referred to as HANK above: quantitative models with household
heterogeneity and incomplete markets that are consistent with microeconomic heterogeneity and
data on household nances, and replicate plausible distributions of wealth and MPCs. Among these,
Kaplan, Violante, and Moll (2014, hereinafter KMV) revisit the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy in such a model with liquid and illiquid assets. In contrast to representative-agent NK models
where monetary policy works mainly through intertemporal substitution, in their model monetary
policy works mainly through what they label an "indirect e¤ect" (the endogenous, general-equilibrium
response of output). Gornemann, Kuester, and Nakajima (2012) also studied monetary transmission
when markets are incomplete and unemployment risk endogenous, focusing on the distributional
welfare e¤ects on households with di¤erent wealth levels.12 McKay, Nakamura, and Steinsson (2015,
hereinafter MNS) use a similar model to those mentioned above, but with exogenous unemployment
risk, to show that forward guidance is less powerful than in the standard model mostly because
an incomplete-markets model implies a form of "discounting" of aggregate demand. Auclert (2015)
analyzes the role of redistribution for the transmission mechanism and decomposes it into three
channels that are related to householdsasset positions, but in a model with one asset only.
Our simplied framework captures some key features and mechanisms of recent quantitative
HANK models, yet it trades o¤ some (relevant and important, but thoroughly analyzed elsewhere)
complexity for analytical tractability. This allows us to analyze the transmission and design of
optimal monetary policy, which are integral parts of the state-of-the-art NK framework.13
Because we use this model to look at optimal monetary policy, we owe much debt to the literature
the model numerically to study determinacy and scal multipliers. Bilbiie (2004, 2008) derives for the rst time
an analytical aggregate demand IS curve emphasizing the Keynesian amplication with hand-to-mouth agents, and
studies optimal policy. Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) combine a very similar aggregate IS curve with a particular
theory of the natural interest rate in order to build a fascinating story of deleveraging, debt deation, and the liquidity
trap. Nistico (2015) allows households to switch stochastically between the two states, and also computes optimal
monetary policy. Yet another, separate but related stream studies "nancial accelerator" models see Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005). Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) review this literature.
12Several other models combine incomplete markets, nominal rigidities, and search and matching frictions. Ravn
and Sterk (2013) focus on unemployment risk and show that job uncertainty generates deep and lasting recessions
through aggregate demand amplication. Den Haan, Rendhal and Riegler (2016) show that such a model with sticky
wages delivers a deationary spiral, a key element of which is (precautionary) demand for money (which enters the
utility function); there is a role for unemployment insurance in that model, as in McKay and Reis (2015). Challe,
Matheron, Ragot, and Rubio-Ramirez (2015) estimate a model of this vintage using Bayesian methods, and assess the
quantitative importance of the link between precautionary saving and aggregate demand. Bayer, Luetticke, Pham-Dao,
and Tjaden (2015) look at the e¤ect of idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks.
13To x ideas, one could argue that while the existing literature in this realm puts more emphasis on the
"heterogeneous-agent" part of HANK, our framework does the opposite it simplies heterogeneity to put more
emphasis on the latter part of HANK. In our opinion, the two approaches are complementary.
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that, building on the seminal paper of Lucas and Stokey (1983), shaped our understanding of optimal
policy in NK models. Some of the key contributions include Khan, King, and Wollman (2003), Adao,
Correia, and Teles (2003), Woodford (2003, Ch. 6), Benigno and Woodford (2005, 2012), and
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004, 2007).
Signicant deviations from price stability are optimal in our framework, and not only in the long
run the cited papers also imply, when relying on (other, di¤erent) money demand theories, some
convex combination between the Friedman rule and a zero ination long-run prescription. More
surprisingly, our framework also gives rise to signicant optimal deviations from price stability over
the cycle in response to shocks that in existing frameworks do not generate such deviations. A
welfare-maximizing central bank relies on ination volatility optimally, as this ination volatility
is associated with providing liquidity for insurance and contributes to reducing inequality even
though, as we shall see, ination is unconditionally "bad" for constrained households because it
reduces the real value of their money balances. Renouncing this volatility (by adopting a policy of
constant deation at the optimal asymptotic rate) thus has a large welfare cost in our model, whereas
it is innocuous in the NK models with money demand reviewed above. The key to this di¤erence is
inequality, and the liquidity-insurance motive mentioned above.
Ours is not the only paper to study optimal monetary policy with heterogeneous house-
holds and sticky prices (in HANK-type models). Several earlier studies analyzed optimal mon-
etary policy in di¤erent heterogeneous-agents models, focusing on other channels. In the realm of
two-agent models, Bilbiie (2008) derives optimal policy in a model with hand-to-mouth agents, and
Curdia and Woodford (2009) and Nistico (2016) in models with infrequent participation and borrow-
ers and savers. The setup of these last two papers shares similarities to ours, in particular concerning
the "infrequent participation" structure that draws on an earlier monetary theory literature; but in
the domain of optimal policy, these studies focus on the case where there is perfect insurance in
steady state, thus abstracting from the liquidity-insurance, or inequality channel that gives rise to
the novel trade-o¤ we emphasize.14
Lastly, several more recent and independent papers deal broadly with the same topic but di¤er
substantially and in several key respects: assumptions about the environment, solution techniques,
results, and economic intuition and mechanisms. Di¤erently from Bhandari, Evans, Golosov and
Sargent (2017), we consider an economy with two assets to analyze the role of liquidity injections when
liquidity constraints bind occasionally; this is also di¤erent relative to Challe (2017). The di¤erence
with respect to Nuno and Thomas (2017) is that we consider aggregate shocks, and infrequent
14An important di¤erence between our model and Curida and Woodfords is also that our non-participant agents
are liquidity constrained, and consume a liquidity injection that relaxes this constraint. Whereas in their setup, non-
participant borrowers can borrow but subject to a spread. Braun and Nakajima (2012) prove an aggregation result,
showing the conditions under which the optimal policy in an incomplete-market economy is the same as that of a
representative-agent model.
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participation in nancial markets. In short, the key mechanism we focus on, di¤erently from these
papers, is precisely self-insurance through liquidity, in an economy with two types of assets liquid
and illiquid, and limited participation.15
What distinguishes our framework is the introduction of limited participation in nancial markets
as a microfoundation for liquidity (money); we thus consider two assets, at the cost of a simplication
of the cross-sectional distribution.16 We therefore focus on and isolate a novel trade-o¤ between
liquidity-insurance (inequality), and standard stabilization. We nd closed-form solutions for the case
of exogenous policy and when solving for optimal policy, we summarize the trade-o¤s through a "loss
function" which allows a transparent illustration of the mechanism at work. The Ramsey problem
that we solve is simple and transparent: it implies that imperfect long-run consumption insurance
(an aspect of inequality), is enough and hence essential to motivate large optimal deviations from
price stability stemming from a motive to provide liquidity.
2 A Monetary NK Model with Heterogeneous Agents
We build a simple, tractable, heterogeneous-agent, New Keynesian model with money: heterogenous
households hold money to self-insure against idiosyncratic risk, markets are incomplete, participation
is limited (infrequent), and price adjustment is costly. The main idea, following contributions re-
viewed in the introduction and referred to below, is to introduce partial insurance among a subgroup
of households to reduce heterogeneity while preserving the self-insurance motive.
Households. There is a mass 1 of households, indexed by j 2 [0; 1], who discount the future at
rate  and derive utility from consumption cjt and disutility from labor supply l
j
t . The period utility
function is:
u
 
cjt
   ljt1+'
1 + '
;
with u (c) = (c1    1) = (1  ). Households have access to three assets: money (with zero nominal
return), public debt (with nominal return it > 0), and shares in monopolistically competitive rms.
Money is held despite being a dominated asset because nancial frictions give it a consumption-
smoothing, insurance role. These frictions are: uninsurable idiosyncratic risks and infrequent par-
ticipation in nancial markets. Such frictions customarily generate a large amount of heterogeneity:
the economy is characterized by a continuous distribution of wealth, which is very hard to study with
15In both Bhandari et al and Nuno and Thomas, the main channel (absent in our paper) is instead "Fisherian":
ination redistributes from savers to borrowers by reducing the value of debt. This mechanism is absent in our
paper. While in Challe (2017), there are no deviations from price stability under optimal policy when the uninsurable
idiosyncratic risk is endogenous unemployment (in the absence of equilibrium trade and endogenous liquidity).
16Limited participation being a pervasive fact in the US data, the heterogeneity of returns that we consider is likely
important for the link between monetary policy and liquidity-insurance.
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aggregate shocks and sticky prices.
To simplify the problem (and thus enable us to perform the analysis previewed in the Introduc-
tion), we use tools developed in the incomplete-markets literature to reduce the amount of hetero-
geneity. These simplications keep the essence of intertemporal trade-o¤s and of redistributive e¤ects
of monetary policy in general equilibrium, and can be viewed as a simple generalization of the Lucas
(1990) multiple-member household metaphor. As we shall see, in our economy the key intertemporal
trade-o¤s are captured by householdsEuler equations for money and other assets; at the same time,
a relevant but limited amount of heterogeneity captures the redistributive e¤ects of ination and
money creation.17 The gain of this modeling strategy is that one can use standard techniques used
in representative-agent (New Keynesian or otherwise) models. In particular, we can solve a version
of the model in closed-form by standard local approximation, and compute Ramsey-optimal policy
with aggregate shocks.18
Households participate infrequently in nancial markets. When they do, they can freely adjust
their portfolio and receive dividends from rms. When they do not, they can use only money to
smooth consumption. Denote by  the probability to keep participating in period t+ 1, conditional
upon participating at t (hence, the probability to switch to not participating is 1 ). Likewise, call
 the probability to keep non-participating in period t + 1, conditional upon not participating at t
(hence, the probability to become a participant is 1  ). The fraction of participating households is
n = (1  ) = (2    ), and the fraction 1  n = (1  ) = (2    ) does not participate.
Furthermore, households belong to a family whose head maximizes the intertemporal welfare of
family members using a utilitarian welfare criterion (all households are equally weighted), but faces
some limits to the amount of risk sharing that it can do. Households can be thought of as being
in two states or "islands"19. All households who are participating in nancial markets are on the
same island, called P . All households who are not participating in nancial markets are on the same
island, called N . The family head can transfer all resources across households within the island, but
cannot transfer some resources between islands.
Households in the participating island work at real wage wt. To simplify the exposition, we
assume as a benchmark that non-participating households work to get a xed exogenous income, a
home-production amount  (which is also their xed labor supply) that is low enough to induce them
17See also Curdia and Woodford (2009) and Nistico (2016) for other applications of the "infrequent participation"
structure in di¤erent contexts with sticky prices.
18As will become clear conceptually below, because of the extreme truncation of the state space that we use, the
environment can be extended to more states with little increase in computational di¢ culty we use Dynare to compute
Ramsey-optimal policy.
19The use of the family head and island metaphors builds on Challe et al (2017); this is generalized further, in a
diferent context, by Le Grand and Ragot (2017). Khan and Thomas (2011) provide a decentralization of the family
head assumption with limited participation. We use limited participation in nancial markets to introduce a demand
for liquidity for self-insurance.
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to self-insure. This isolates the channel that we want to emphasize: self-insurance through money in
face of uninsurable risk. In this version, a natural interpretation of the idiosyncratic risk is related
to unemployment, but our framework is more general and can accommodate several others: broadly
speaking, we can think of these shocks as "liquidity shocks", i.e. any shock that makes households
want to consume and increase their demand for liquidity. We then relax this assumption and study
a version of the model where non-participating households also work at the market wage.
The timing is the following. At the beginning of the period, the family head pools resources within
the island. The aggregate shocks are revealed and the family head determines the consumption/saving
choice for each household in each island. Then households learn their next-period participation status
and have to move to the corresponding island accordingly, taking only money with them. The key
assumption is that the family head cannot make transfers to households after the idiosyncratic shock
is revealed, and will take this as a constraint for the consumption/saving choice.
The ows across islands are as follows. The total measure of households leaving the N island
each period is the number of households who participate next period: (1  n) (1  ). The measure
of households staying on the island is thus (1  n) . In addition, a measure (1  )n leaves the P
island for the N island at the end of each period.
Total welfare maximization implies that the family head pools resources at the beginning of the
period in a given island and implements symmetric consumption/saving choices for all households in
that island. Denote as bPt+1 andM
P
t+1 the per-capita period t bonds and money balances respectively,
in the P island, after the consumption-saving choice. The real money balances are mPt+1 =M
P
t+1=Pt;
where Pt is the price level. The end-of-period per capita real values (after the consumption/saving
choice but before agents move across islands) are ~bPt+1 and ~m
P
t+1. Denote as m
N
t the per capita
beginning-of-period capital money in the N island (where the only asset is money). The end-of-
period values (before agents move across islands) are ~mNt+1. We have the following relations, after
simplication (as bonds do not leave the P island, we have bPt+1 = ~b
P
t+1):
mPt+1 =  ~m
P
t+1 + (1  ) ~mNt+1 (1)
mNt+1 = (1  ) ~mPt+1 +  ~mNt+1:
The program of the family head is (with t = (Pt   Pt 1)=Pt 1 denoting the net ination rate):
W
 
bPt ;m
P
t ;m
N
t ; Xt

= max
fcPt ;~bPt+1;
~mPt+1; ~m
N
t+1;c
N
t ;l
P
t g
n
"
u
 
cPt
   lPt 1+'
1 + '
#
+ (1  n)

u
 
cNt
   1+'
1 + '

+EW
 
bPt+1;m
P
t+1;m
N
t+1; Xt+1

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subject to:
cPt +
~bPt+1 + ~m
P
t+1 = wtl
P
t   Pt (2)
+
1 + it 1
1 + t
bPt +
mPt
1 + t
+
1
n
dt;
~mNt+1 + c
N
t =    Nt +
mNt
1 + t
(3)
~mPt+1; ~m
N
t+1  0 (4)
and the laws of motion for money ows relating mjt+1 to ~m
j
t+1 (1). Equation (2) is the per capita
budget constraint in the P island: P -households (who own all the rms) receive dividends dt=n, and
the real return on money and bond holdings. With these resources they consume and save in money
in bonds, and pay taxes/receive transfers Pt (lump-sum taxes include any new money created or
destroyed). Equation (3) is the budget constraint in the N island. Finally (4) are positive constraints
on money holdings and are akin to credit constraints in the heterogeneous-agent literature. The
variable Xt in the value function refers to all relevant period t information necessary to form rational
expectations. Using the rst-order and envelope conditions, we have:
u0
 
cPt
  E 1 + it
1 + t+1
u0
 
cPt+1

and ~bPt+1 = 0 (5)
u0
 
cPt
  E u0  cPt+1+ (1  )u0  cNt+1 11 + t+1 or ~mPt+1 = 0 (6)
u0
 
cNt
  E (1  )u0  cPt+1+ u0  cNt+1 11 + t+1 or ~mNt+1 = 0 (7)
wtu
0  cPt  =   lPt ' (8)
The rst Euler equation corresponds to the choice of bonds: there is no self-insurance motive, for
they cannot be carried to the N island: the equation is the same as with a representative agent.20
The money choice of P -island agents is governed by (6), which takes into account that money
can be used when moving to the N island. The third equation (7) determines the money choice of
agents in the N island, and the last equation labor supply.
The important implication of this market structure is that the Euler equations (6) and (7) have
the same form as in a fully-edged incomplete-markets model of the Bewely-Huggett-Aiyagari type.
In particular, the probability 1   measures the uninsurable risk to switch to "low income" (unem-
ployment) next period, risk for which money is the only means to self-insure. This is why money is
held in equilibrium for self-insurance purposes, despite being a dominated asset.
20An intuition for the underlying market structure is as follows. As agents pool resources when participating
(which would be optimal with symmetric agents in time 0 and time 0 trading), they perceive a return conditional on
participating next period in nancial markets. This exactly compensates for the probability of not participating next
period, thus generating the same Euler equation as with a representative agent.
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Production and Price Setting. The nal good is produced by a rm using intermediate
goods as inputs. The nal sector production function is Yt =
R 1
0
(yt (z))
1  1
" dz
 "
" 1
, where yt is
the amount of intermediate good z used in production. Denote as Pt (z) the price of intermediate
goods z. Demand for an individual product is Yt (z) = (Pt (z) =Pt) " Yt with the welfare-based price
index Pt =
R 1
0
Pt (z)1 " dz
 1
1 "
. Each individual good is produced by a monopolistic competitive
rm, indexed by z, using a technology given by: Yt(z) = Atlt(z). Cost minimization, taking the
wage as given, implies that the real marginal cost is Wt= (AtPt) : The problem of producer z is to
maximize the present value of future prots, discounted using the stochastic discount factor of their
shareholders, the participants.
When price adjustment is frictionless, prices of all rms are equal to a constant markup over
the nominal marginal cost the real marginal cost is constant Wt= (AtPt) = ("  1) =": We assume
that rms are subject to nominal rigidities as in Rotemberg (1982): to change their prices, rms
incur a quadratic adjustment cost that is homogenous across rms. Prots of each rm are thus
given by dt =

1  wt
At
  
2
2t

Yt, anticipating that the equilibrium is symmetric. Maximization of
their present discounted value gives rise to the nonlinear forward-looking "New Keynesian Phillips
curve", whose derivation is described in detail in the Appendix where we replaced the labor supply
schedule wt = 
 
lPt
'  
cPt

:
t (1 + t) = Et

cPt
cPt+1

Yt+1
Yt
t+1 (1 + t+1)

+
"

 

 
lPt
'  
cPt

At
+   1
!
; (9)
where   1   ("  1) (1 + ) =" captures the steady-state distortion and  is a corrective sales
subsidy. In particular, when the subsidy is equal to the desired net markup  = ("  1) 1 ; there is
no steady-state distortion associated with monopolistic competition and elastic labor,  = 0. These
considerations will be useful when studying the Ramsey policy below.
Money Creation and the Government Budget. To start with, we assume that money
is created through "helicopter drops", although we also look at the implications of open-market
operations later. Furthermore, we focus on uniform taxation Pt = 
N
t =  t.
21. Denote by xt the
(real value of) new money created in period t, and by M tott+1 the total nominal quantity of money in
circulation at the end of each period. In nominal terms, M tott+1 =M
tot
t + Ptxt, and in real terms:
mtott+1 =
mtott
1 + t
+ xt (10)
21We abstract from the possibility of exogenous redistribution by choosing type-specic transfers: Pt =
!
n  t; 
N
t =
1 !
1 n  t where ! is the share of total taxes paid by all type-N agents (we focus here on ! = n, entirely lump-sum
transfers). But it can be easily shown that there exist (i) processes  jt that (redistribute money so as to) replicate
Woodfords cashless limit; and (ii) a value of ! that restores neutrality and Wallaces 1981 logic i.e. "keeping scal
policy constant" in the sense of nding an (exogenous) redistribution that un-does the endogenous redistribution
triggered by a monetary policy shock in our framework.
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Hence, the total period t net taxes/transfers are  t =  xt:
Market clearing and equilibrium. Since there is no public debt, the period t market for
bonds is nbpt+1 = 0. The money market clears m
tot
t+1 = (1  n) ~mNt+1 + n ~mPt+1 and so does the labor
market lt = nlPt . Denoting by ct total consumption and Yt = Atlt market-produced output (or earned
total income), we have that the goods market will also clear, by WalrasLaw:
ct  ncPt + (1  n) cNt =

1  
2
2t

Yt + (1  n) : (11)
Note for further use that there is a resource cost of changing prices (ination), which is isomorphic
to the welfare cost of relative price dispersion in a Calvo-type model, see e.g. Woodford (2003). In
Appendix A we provide the summary of model equations and the equilibrium denition.
Steady state. The analysis of the models steady state (dened as an allocation where real
variables are constant and nominal variables grow at a constant rate ) provides a series of rst
insights into its monetary structure. The Euler equation for bonds implies that their real return is
always equal to the inverse of the discount factor:
1 + i
1 + 
=  1:
Dening qt  cPt =cNt , as consumption inequality (imperfect insurance), the self-insurance Euler
equation delivers:
q  c
P
cN
=
 
1+

  
1  
! 1

> 1:
Letting the steady-state share of exogenous income of N in average consumption be c  =c (recall
this is home production, or unemployment benets when interpreting idiosyncratic risk as unem-
ployment risk), and the share of N householdsconsumption in total be h (with the share of Ps
consumption in total similarly denoted by p):
h  c
N
c
=
1
1 + n (q   1) ;
we nd (as long as it is positive) the steady-state money demand share, or inverse consumption
velocity of money:22
  m
tot
c
=
(h  c) (1 + )
2    +  :
Subject to a caveat of existence of a monetary equilibrium, discussed in detail in Appendix
B, steady-state money demand is equal to the share of (non-home-produced) consumption of N
(adjusted for ination), divided by a parameter capturing the degree of overall churning, the sum
of the transition probabilities from one state to another. Under the restriction  +  > 1 (which
we return to below), this parameter is between 0 and 1. For a given level of home production, this
22Appendix B.7 provides the expression for the model variant where N are employed at the market wage.
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expression implicitly denes upper bounds on the degree of market incompleteness (as described by
 and ) so that steady-state money demand is positive.23 Conversely, for given  and  there exists
a threshold  beyond which P choose not to hold money: the outside option is too good and there
is no need to self-insure. Thus, c captures the degree of insurance provided by (un-modelled) scal
transfers: were it high enough, no liquidity would be traded  = 0 and there would be no role for
monetary policy in this model beyond its standard role in cashless models. We will focus on the case
with equilibrium liquidity and inequality, c < h < 1.
2.1 Simple Monetary NK Model with Heterogeneous Agents
It is instructive to pause and compare the household side of our model with that of the seminal
HANK papers reviewed in the introduction. This helps understand how ours is a simplied version
of that framework what mechanisms it still captures, and what it leaves out in order to gain
tractability. Take rst our concept of liquidity, which di¤ers from KVMs, where bonds are liquid
and equity and housing illiquid. In assuming that bonds and equity are illiquid while money is
liquid, we follow the denition of the monetary theory that we reviewed.24 Second, our constrained
unit-MPC households are wealthy hand-to-mouth, similarly to KMVs their wealth is located just
on the P island, where they have a positive probability of going (back). Third, unlike in KMV, our
constrained households in the baseline have exogenous income. An earlier literature already claried
the amplifying, Keynesian e¤ect on monetary transmission of hand-to-mouth households who have
endogenous income because they are employed (see Bilbiie, 2004; 2008 and the discussion in the
Introduction). We rst abstract from that well-understood general equilibrium channel to isolate
and better understand another, which we emphasize below endogenous movements in liquidity;
this is also consistent with an interpretation of the uninsurable risk being related to unemployment,
as in MNS.25 We then introduce this channel by studying a version of our model where constrained
households are employed and have endogenous income. Lastly, the assumptions we used to reduce
heterogeneity and history-dependence have a close counterpart in the sticky-price literature that
is probably clear to readers well-seasoned in NK models: our participation/insurance scheme is
conceptually similar to the Calvo model of price stickiness. Whereas KMVs portfolio decision based
on a quadratic transaction cost for illiquid assets generate endogenous participation in liquidity; since
23The formal restriction is, for the case of zero steady-state ination and treating n as a parameter:  < 1 n 1 1
 1c  1 <
 1: In terms of the original parameter  we have 1 1  >
q
1
4 +
(1 )c
(1 )(1 c)   12 :
24Tongue in cheek, one may label this a MONK model, as in "monetarist New Keynesian". See Weill (2007),
Rocheteau and Weill (2011), Kiyotaki and Moore (2012), and Cui and Sadde (2016) for recent sophisticatd renements
(as well as reviews) of the concept of liquidity in recent monetary theory, including a di¤erent view of liquidity based
on asset resalability (while our is on limited participation).
25Unemployment risk is exogenous in MNS, but endogenous through search and matching in other HANK models
reviewed in the introduction.
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state variables enter this decision (generating complex distributional dynamics that our simplication
abstracts from) this is closer to state-dependent models of price stickiness.
Thus, our model cannot t the detailed distribution of asset holdings and wealth, nor reproduce
movements in portfolio shares or realistic idiosyncratic income processes it does not capture the rich
household wealth dynamics of fully-edged Bewley-Aiyagari-Huggett models; in particular, it does
not capture tails of the distribution households who have a long stream of good (or bad) luck. But
it does captures market incompleteness by one parameter through which, as we shall see, "history
matters" even though for just one period. The simplications "buy" us the ability to compute
optimal policy transparently.26
3 Inspecting HANK Transmission: Liquidity and Aggre-
gate Demand
In this section, we use our simple and tractable model to shed light on some of its properties that
are key for understanding optimal monetary policy. First, we assume that liquidity provision is
exogenous the central bank follows a money supply (growth) rule and study the e¤ect and trans-
mission of a liquidity injection. Then, we study whether (endogenous) liquidity provision can be used
to provide insurance, i.e. neutralize the e¤ect of aggregate shocks on inequality and if so, with what
inationary consequences? To explore these questions, we use a local approximation of the model
around a steady state with zero ination  = 0 for ease of illustration (a summary of all loglinearized
equilibrium conditions around an arbitrary ination rate is in Appendix B). Denote log-deviations
of any variable by a hat, unless specied otherwise.
The Euler equation of participants and the self-insurance equation are given by, respectively:
c^Pt = Etc^
P
t+1    1 (it   Et^t+1) ; (12)
c^Pt = Etc^
P
t+1 + (1  )Etc^Nt+1 +  1Et^t+1: (13)
Let x^t  (xt   x) =mtot be the deviation of new money issued by the central bank today, as a
fraction of steady-state total money. The equation governing money growth is hence:
x^t = m^
tot
t+1   m^tott + ^t (14)
26In a separate paper, we concentrate on the positive implications: we loglinearize this model, solve it in closed-
form, and analyze the monetary transmission mechanism. We show that the Taylor principle fails dramatically in
this economy: the central bank cannot stick to a Taylor rule that is otherwise reasonable in the representative-agent
model. Augmenting the rule with inequality or a measure of liquidity restores determinacy, while a money growth rule
is even better.
15
The linearized budget constraint of non-participants is:
c^Nt =
1  
1  n

h
 
m^tott   ^t

+

h
x^t: (15)
Newmoney x^t reachesN agents within the period (because money is issued through helicopter drops),
and the Pigou e¤ect reduces the value of their outstanding real balances. Finally, the price-setting
equation is the loglinearized version of (9):27
^t = Et^t+1 +  

('np+ ) c^Pt + ' (1  n)hc^Nt   (1 + ') a^t

: (16)
with   " 1

ranging from 0 (xed prices) to 1 (exible prices) and ' = '= (1  (1  n) c).28
A local rational expectations equilibrium consists of a vector of processes c^Nt ; c^
P
t ; {^t; ^t; x^t; m^
tot
t+1
that satisfy the equations (12) to (16). The reduced-form model, while capturing key elements
of modern HANK models, is thus reminiscent of both "old" monetarist and Keynesian "dynamic
ISLM" models such as Sargent and Wallace (1975), or Sargent (1987). To close the model, we
need to specify how monetary policy is conducted. In this section, we sketch the e¤ects of monetary
injections and analyze their transmission under the assumption that the central bank chooses money
growth (under which, as in Sargent and Wallace, the equilibrium is determinate). Subsequently, we
solve for the optimal policy of the central bank: liquidity will then be determined endogenously.29
3.1 Liquidity-Insurance, Aggregate Demand, and Ination
Combining (13) and (12), we obtain a core equation of our model, which captures the link between
interest rates (the price of liquidity) and lack of consumption insurance, or "inequality" dened as
q^t  c^Pt   c^Nt :
Etq^t+1 = Etc^
P
t+1   Etc^Nt+1 =
 1
1   {^t (17)
This illustrates the insurance role of monetary policy in our model: as the opportunity cost of
holding liquidity (i) falls, P hold more of it, leading to higher consumption for N (and lower for
27We used that aggregate labor supply is proportional to participants labor supply l^t = l^Pt ; the linearized la-
bor supply equation 'l^t = w^t   c^Pt , the economy resource constraint c^t = (1  (1  n) c)

l^t + a^t

with aggregate
consumption (denoting p  cP =c = qh): c^t = npc^Pt + (1  n)hc^Nt . Finally, ' = '= (1  (1  n) c) :
28Both agents consume the output, so movements along the labor supply curve concern them both: thus, the real
wage depends on total consumption with elasticity '. However, since only participants work, they are the only ones
subject to the income e¤ect: thus, the real wage depends only on consumption of participants with elasticity equal to
the income e¤ect . This generates an asymmetry in the inationary e¤ects of consumption of the two agents.
29In a separate paper, we analyze the other case: monetary policy via Taylor-type interest rate rules, and ask:
how does a central bank ensure equilibrium determinacy in an incomplete-markets economy where liquidity (money
creation) x^t is endogenous. It turns out that endogenous uctuations in precautionary liquidity seriously challenge the
central banks control of aggregate demand and question the appropriateness of Taylor rules. For moderate market
incompleteness, the Taylor coe¢ cients required for determinacy are in the double digits but responding to inequality
or liquidity can restore conventional wisdom in the form of the "Taylor principle".
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P) agents tomorrow. Hence, more liquidity (lower interest rates) leads to more insurance (lower
future inequality). This e¤ect is stronger, the more intertemporal substitution there is (higher
 1) and the higher is . This equilibrium outcome of our model is consistent with the empirical
ndings documenting a positive correlation between expansionary, inationary monetary policy and
redistribution; see for example Doepke and Schneider (2006), Adam and Zhu (2014), and Coibion et
al (2013).
Monetary-NK IS curve. Aggregate demand in our economy is made of the demand of the
two types, participants and nonparticipants. The demand of participants is determined by an Euler
equation, but in contrast to the standard RA model (and to models with hand-to-mouth agents)
this Euler equation includes an insurance/precautionary saving motive (13). That equation thus
links the two components of aggregate demand: participantsand non-participants. The latter is
determined by the previous accumulation of money balances, and by the money transfer received, as
in (15). Ination has an impact on both householdsdemand: realized ination reduces the real value
of money balances (and hence, the income and consumption) of N , while expected future ination
inuences the insurance decision of P .
Combining (15), and (14), we obtain an equation linking the aggregate demand of N to money
transfers and ination:
(1  n)hc^Nt =  (  n) x^t +  (1  ) m^tott+1
=  (1  n) m^tott+1    (  n)
 
m^tott   ^t

(18)
The key measure of market incompleteness in our model is:
  n = (1  n) (+   1) > 0;
which captures the direct e¤ect on non-participantsdemand of an increase in liquidity xt . Indeed,
   n captures the idea that the conditional probability of remaining P is higher than the uncon-
ditional probability of becoming P , i.e. the share of P in the total population. The parameter thus
measures the incumbentsadvantage, the "memory" of the process, or the trialsnot being indepen-
dent:  > 1  implies that it is more likely for a P household to stay P than it is for an N household
to become P (with the labor-risk interpretation, it implies that is is more likely for an employed agent
to keep their job than for an unemployed agent to become employed, which is a natural restriction).
In equilibrium,   n is hence the elasticity (integrated across all) of N agentsconsumption to a
monetary transfer (for given future real money balances): for while an 1 n fraction is consumed by
N , a 1  fraction is saved for self-insurance purposes by P . The same parameter captures also the
elasticity of Ns aggregate demand to ination, for given real money balances that is, the Pigou
e¤ect discussed previously.
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The aggregate IS curve of our economy is obtained by using (18) twice (evaluated at t and
t+1), together with the Euler equation of participants (12), the expression of aggregate consumption
c^t = npc^
P
t + (1  n)hc^Nt , and money growth (14):
c^t = Etc^t+1   np 1 (^{t   Et^t+1) +  (1  )Et^t+1 (19)
+ (  n) x^t    (1  n)Etx^t+1
Through what we could call the monetary-New Keynesian IS curve (19), aggregate demand
depends on money (liquidity), interest, and prices (ination) hat tip to Patinkin (1956). There
are three main di¤erences with respect to the aggregate IS curve of a standard representative-agent
economy, corresponding to these three components.
First, money (liquidity) creation a¤ects aggregate demand directly, through its impact on ag-
gregate demand of N agents discussed in detail above. This e¤ect is proportional to    n > 0;
which captures market incompleteness in our model as explained above: while a fraction 1 n of the
liquidity injection gets consumed by the hand-to-mouth, constrained N , a fraction 1    is held as
insurance by the precautionary P which gives the net e¤ect of 1  n  (1  ) =   n.30
Second, expected ination matters for aggregate demand over and above its e¤ect through the ex-
ante real interest rate (our next point). Higher expected ination creates more demand today at given
real interest rates (through  (1  )Et^t+1) by intertemporal substitution, because it diminishes the
real value of liquidity tomorrow. This expected ination channel is "as if" N were at the zero lower
bound permanently.
Lastly, the interest-elasticity of aggregate demand is lower than in a representative-agent econ-
omy: np 1 <  1 and decreasing with the share of constrained households (as in MNS). This is
the opposite with respect to a model in which nonparticipants have endogenous labor income ( for
instance, employed at the market wage).31 In that model (that we also study below), the interest
elasticity of aggregate demand is increasing with the share of hand-to-mouth nonparticipants: in
response to a cut in interest rates, demand expands, labor demand shifts, and the wage increases;
the income of the constrained increases, leading to a further amplication on demand. We rst
abstract from this to focus in isolation on the role of liquidity (money) for self-insurance against
30A particular exogenous redistribution through transwers nP =  is one instance of a Wallace (1981)-type
"constant scal policy" that will undo the e¤ect of monetary injections.
31See Bilbiie (2008) for a full analysis of a cashless model with employed nonparticipants (including the case where
at high values of the share of non-participants, the interest elasticity of aggregate demand changes sign). See Gali,
Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2004, 2007) for related models with hand-to-mouth agents focusing on di¤erent issues.
Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) use a similar aggregate demand structure to analyze deleveraging and liquidity traps.
See Bilbiie (2017) for further discussion of the di¤erence between the two aggregate demand models and their di¤erent
implications for forward guidance.
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idiosyncratic risk, by assuming that all nonparticipants have exogenous income. We then relax this
assumption below to also study the role of the "endogenous income", New Keynesian cross channel.
The aggregate IS curve for that model (see Appendix B.7) shows that the same (NK cross) ampli-
cation mechanism discussed in Bilbiie (2008, 2017) applies here both with respect to interest rate
changes but also, something novel here, with respect to the other aggregate demand determinants:
liquidity, and expected ination. Yet because bonds are illiquid here, in contrast to MNS and other
contributions discussed in the Appendix, there is no "discounting" in the aggregate Euler equation,
and no interaction between amplication and discounting.
Reduced form, 3-equation model. Rewriting the self-insurance equation using the denition
of inequality and replacing the budget constraint of N , we obtain an equation that links inequality
(imperfect insurance) to present and future liquidity, and expected ination:
qt = Etqt+1     n
1  n

h
x^t +

h
Etx^t+1 +

 1   1  
1  n

h

Et^t+1; (20)
Expected ination has two opposing e¤ects on present inequality, keeping future inequality (and
hence the nominal interest rate) xed. On the one hand, it tells P to consume more today, for
money will have a lower payo¤ tomorrow this is driven by intertemporal substitution. On the other
hand, the Pigou e¤ect on N tomorrow tells P (who might become N tomorrow) to save more for
precautionary reasons, i.e. hold more liquidity and consume less an income e¤ect that gives more
insurance today. With log utility the elasticity to ination is positive and less than unity, namely
0 < c
h
< 1 (as required by positive steady-state money demand).
Since under a money growth rule liquidity is exogenous, we can solve for the entire path of
inequality and ination using equations (20) and (16), appropriately rewritten as:
^t = Et^t+1 +  

('np+ ) qt + ('+ )

1  
1  n

h
 
m^tott   ^t

+

h
x^t

  (1 + ') a^t

;
where a^t is the log-deviation of the technology level At. The money equation (14) then determines
the path of real money balances, while the nominal interest rate is proportional to expected future
inequality as explained above in (17). Note that there is a liquidity e¤ect if expected inequality falls
when issuing money.
Solving the model in closed form is not possible in the general case under a money growth rule
(14) a property shared with even the simplest textbook NK model with money, e.g. Galí (2008). To
obtain closed-form solutions that help our understanding of the model, we consider two instructive
special cases.
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3.2 Closed-form solution with horizontal aggregate supply (xed prices)
Consider the extreme case of xed prices  = 0.32 Under this assumption, ination does not move
^ft = 0, so one equation (20) is enough to determine equilibrium, which is locally unique because
 < 1; solving it forward under the assumption that money growth is AR(1), Etx^t+1 = xx^t; we
obtain:
qft =  
 n
1 n   x
1  x

h
x^t (21)
The response depends on our key parameter,  n: the larger it is, the larger the e¤ect of liquidity on
aggregate demand (through demand of the constrained), and the larger the ensuing fall in inequality.
If the shock is "too" persistent, inequality can increase as agents correctly anticipate the future
windfall and self-insure less. The path of nominal interest rates is immediately determined through
(17): in particular, there is a liquidity e¤ect (interest rates fall) if and only if (i). the increase in
liquidity is persistent but (ii). not too persistent (so that inequality goes down): 0 < x <
 n
1 n .
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3.3 Perfect insurance and ination
In order to help our intuition for the full optimal policy considered next, it is instructive to consider
the mechanics of endogenous liquidity, given an allocation. In particular, we consider the endogenous
path of liquidity x^t necessary to implement two specic allocations when the economy is hit by
aggregate shocks at. The rst allocation we consider is the perfect-insurance benchmark as we show
formally below, this is the rst-best limit of our economy. We compare this with a policy of perfectly
stabilizing ination. Subsequently, we conduct a rigorous Ramsey-optimal policy exercise but the
purpose here is to elucidate the mechanism at work using simple closed-form expressions allowed by
our model.
Consider rst the policy implementing perfect insurance (qt = 0) under exible prices and starting
from a steady state with q = 1 (h = p = 1).34 Assuming further log utility, the solution for inequality
in the simplest iid case is, dening 
  1+'
1+'
(1  c) > 0:
qt =    n
1  
x^t + ca^t:
Denoting with a double star the economy with no inequality variations qt = 0, the level of endogenous
32A closed-form solution can also be obtained in the other polar case of exible prices,  !1; but without obtaining
much additional intuition for our purposes in the case of exogenous liquidity.
33The result that sticky-price models deliver a liquidity e¤ect is emphasized by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005). The same authors compared sticky-price and limited-participation modelsability to deliver a liquidity e¤ect
in previous work see Christiano (1991), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992, 1995); see also Fuerst (1992).
34Notice that the welfare objective is not merely perfect insurance in deviations; as our objective function derived
below shows clearly, there is a rationale for increasing cN in levels.
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liquidity injection that achieves this is:
x^t =
1  
  n
c


a^t;
which is always positive because 1 > c > 0: It is decreasing with    n because, as shown above,
   n captures the elasticity of aggregate demand (and of insurance) to liquidity; the higher this
elasticity, the lower the necessary liquidity injection.
One key implication of this policy is that ination varies, namely:
d^t
dat
=
1



1  n
  nc   1

dEt^

t+1
da^t
=
1 + '
1 + '
In particular, expected ination gives agents the right intertemporal incentives to hold the extra
liquidity for self-insurance purposes. Thus, the equilibrium is one with ination volatility: the
consumption of N is increased by the liquidity injection but decreased by current ination through
the Pigou e¤ect.
Consider now the other extreme, of strict ination targeting: a policy (denoted by superscript
0) of stabilizing ination around the perfect-insurance steady-state (note that the degree of price
stickiness plays no role as ination is constant). Imposing d^
0
t
dat
= 0 at all times, we obtain that
inequality is inversely directly related to liquidity, q0t =  h x^0t , and liquidity and the consumption of
N in this equilibrium are:
dc^N0t
dat
= 
dx^0t
a^t
=
1 + '
' (1  n) :
It then follows immediately by direct inspection that dc^N0t > dc^
N
t : consumption of N respondsmore,
and is thus more volatile under the zero-ination policy. In other words, ination is a means to insure
constrained agents against aggregate risk: even though, in levels, ination decreases consumption
of N, ination volatility reduces Ns volatility of consumption. We will see that this general insight
holds more broadly when we analyze the policy trade-o¤s rigorously by means of a Ramsey-optimal
policy analysis.
4 Optimal Monetary Policy: Insurance, Liquidity, and In-
ation
To understand the role of ination for redistribution and providing insurance, it is useful to start
by looking at the rst-best benchmark (the planner solution) and compare it to our economy with
exible prices. The rst best allocation is obtained when the planner chooses quantities to maximize
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ex-ante aggregate welfare:
max
cpt c
N
t ;l
P
t
E0
1X
t=0
t
 
n
"
u
 
cPt
   lPt 1+'
1 + '
#
+ (1  n)

u
 
cNt
   1+'
1 + '
!
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subject to the resource constraint ncPt + (1  n) cNt = nAtlPt + (1  n) . E¤ectively, there is no
intertemporal problem: the rst-best equilibrium is one with perfect insurance, given by the two
conditions cPt = c
N
t = ct and ct = 
 1=  lPt  '= A1=t . Consider now the market economy with
exible prices,  = 0. The rst-best allocation can be implemented at the Friedman rule, i.e. when
the nominal interest rate is i = 0, and the ination rate  =  1 (because the real interest rate is ):
the return on money is equal to the real interest rate and there is no opportunity cost to self-insure.
But our framework exhibits a di¢ culty which is well known in this class of monetary models starting
from Bewley (1983): that, at the Friedman rule, monetary variables are indeterminate whatever
the nominal quantity of money, the price of the nal good is indeterminate when the real quantity
of money allows households to self-insure;35 furthermore, there exist examples of Bewley economies
in which the Friedman rule is not optimal because of a redistribution e¤ect (when interest payments
are paid through lump-sum taxes), see Mehrling (1995).36
In a general monetary equilibrium with sticky prices ( > 0), a novel trade-o¤ occurs: ination
uctuations (generated by liquidity movements) allow households to self-insure, but generate price
adjustment costs. A zero-ination policy minimizes price adjustment costs, but decrease the ability
of households to self-insure. Optimal monetary policy needs to nd the balance between these two
distortions: inequality, or a scope for providing liquidity-insurance (specic to an incomplete-markets,
limited-participation setup like ours), and costly price adjustment : the standard distortion that
operates in a representative-agent NK model. This section analyzes how this trade-o¤ is resolved
in our model. We solve the full Ramsey-optimal policy, provide a second-order approximation à
la Woodford (2003) that is useful to understand the policy trade-o¤s, and analyze optimal policy
quantitatively. The general theme is that inequality (understood as imperfect insurance) triggers a
liquidity-insurance motive that implies large optimal deviations from price stability in response to
shocks that, absent liquidity, are innocuous.
35The indeterminacy property is not specic to our formalization of money demand. It is also found in simple
cash-in-advance or money-in-the-utility function models, when no satiation point is introduced in the utility function.
See for exemple Correia and Teles (1999) for a discussion. In our model version, this should not be taken as too serious
a critique of the Friedman Rule, for it can be shown that when the policy rule converges to it i  ! 0+ the allocation
is well-dened and converges smoothly to the rst-best allocation see Appendix.
36Mehrling shows that if taxes are independent of wealth or income, but interest is proportional to money holdings,
higher taxes redistribute away from households with little money balances; households eventually get this back once
their money holdings increased, but are made worse o¤ because this is the opposite of insurance: it redistributes from
high-marginal-utility to low-marginal-utility periods.
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4.1 Ramsey-Optimal Policy
Following a long tradition started by Lucas and Stokey (1983), we assume that the central bank acts
as a Ramsey planner who maximizes aggregate welfare. In our economy, this entails calculating the
welfare of the two agents and weighting them by their shares in the population. The constraints of
the planner are the rearranged private equilibrium conditions: self-insurance (6), the Phillips curve
(9), and the economy resource constraint (11).37 We denote the system of these three constraints by
 t
 
cPt ; c
N
t ; l
P
t ; t

: As it is by now well understood, the optimal policy problem of the central bank
can be written as choosing the allocation fcPt ; cNt ; lPt ; tg to maximize the following Lagrangian:
max
fcPt ;cNt ;lPt ;tg
E0
1X
t=0
t
(
n
"
u
 
cPt
   lPt 1+'
1 + '
#
+ (1  n)

u
 
cNt
   1+'
1 + '

+ !t t
)
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where !t is the vector of three costate, Lagrange multipliers, one for each constraint in  t. The
rst-order conditions of this problem are outlined in Appendix B.4, as is the proof of the following
Proposition.
Proposition 1 The optimal long-run ination rate is such that    1    0:
As in other NK models incorporating di¤erent theories of money demand (e.g. Khan et al, 2003;
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004, 2007), the long-run ination rate ranges from the Friedman rule
under exible prices and optimal subsidy, to zero ination under sticky prices and inelastic labor. A
low ination rate allows households to self-insure, but generates price adjustment costs. An ination
rate close to 0 minimizes price adjustment costs, but decreases the ability of households to self-insure,
as the return on money decreases.
But unlike in other NK models, including those incorporating money demand, in our economy
the central bank also uses ination optimally over the cycle, as a by-product of using liquidity to
provide insurance and decrease inequality. We rst illustrate formally the trade-o¤ faced by a central
bank by deriving a second-order approximation to the aggregate utility function, which contains a
liquidity-insurance motive, and we then explore the quantitative signicance of this novel trade-o¤.
4.2 A second-order approximation to welfare
To understand the relevant policy trade-o¤s, we derive a second-order approximation à la Woodford
(2003, Ch. 6) to the aggregate welfare function, around a steady-state with imperfect insurance
37Since the nominal interest rate enters only the Euler equation for bonds, the problem can be regarded as one
where the planner chooses the allocation directly; once the consumption of participants and ination are known,
the optimal interest rate is determined by the Euler equation. By similar reasoning, once the consumption of non-
participants is determined, along with ination, the quantity of real money balances is fully determined too. These
simplications apply only when money is issued via helicopter drops; see Appendix B.4 for the case of optimal policy
under open-market operations.
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(p > 1 > h), an optimal subsidy inducing marginal-cost pricing in steady state ( = 0 in (9)), and
arbitrary steady-state ination.38 Furthermore, we assume for simplicity of exposition but with no
loss of substance that utility is logarithmic in consumption Appendix B.6 presents the more general
CRRA case and the proof of the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 Solving the welfare maximization problem is equivalent to solving:
min
fcPt ;cNt ;qt;tg
1
2
E0
1X
t=0
t

~
2
t + cc^
2
t   c^Nt
	
;
where the optimal relative weights are:
 =

1  
2
2
; c =
1 + '
1  (1  n) c ;
 = 2 (1  n)h (q   1) :
The Proposition transparently illustrates the novel "liquidity-insurance" motive implied by our
framework: a trade-o¤ between insurance (inequality) and stabilization of ination and aggregate
demand.39 The last (linear!) term pertains to lack of insurance: it shows the rst-order welfare
benet of increasing Ns welfare by increasing their consumption level. Intuitively, the weight  is
proportional to the steady-state distortion captured by (q   1) the rst-order benet exists only
insofar as the steady state is distorted to start with. This is analogous to the linear benet of
increasing output above the natural rate when the steady-state is rst-order distorted in the standard
New Keynesian model (see the next footnote). The distortion vanishes when the steady-state is
egalitarian (p = h, perhaps through a steady-state insurance scheme, if enough scal lump-sum
instruments are available to undertake such policy) or, trivially, when n = 1 (the standard cashless
representative-agent NK model). Replacing the equilibrium q reveals that  is proportional to
 1   1 + : the distortion also becomes arbitrarily small when the steady state tends toward the
Friedman rule,  ! 1  1. Our result thus isolates the role of this monetary distortion, assuming a
second-best world whereby scal policy does not achieve perfect insurance. Recall, however, that scal
policy is already doing much redistribution along two dimensions here: it subsidizes rms to induce
marginal cost pricing, and it taxes participants only to nance that subsidy thus redistributing de
facto prot income. The only long-run di¤erence left between the two types is proportional to the
return on nominal assets an inherently monetary distortion, in our view.
38Bilbiie (2008) also derives a quadratic loss function in a cashless economy with hand-to-mouth agents. Curdia and
Woodford (2009) and Nistico (2015) also do this for cashless models with infrequent access to credit markets; unlike
us, they focus on an e¢ cient equilibrium with insurance when calculating optimal policy.
39Note that ~t = t +  is the ination level, so the function is written so that target ination is zero absent
aggregate shocks, ~t = 0. The optimal target is the optimal long-run ination found in the Ramsey problem above,
the equivalent of which is here the steady state of the solution of the relevant linear-quadratic problem.
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Because of the linear term in the loss function, second-order terms in the private constraints
matter for welfare40: as long as there is steady-state inequality, ination and aggregate demand
volatility matter for welfare beyond their direct e¤ects through  and c. The reason is by now
intuitively clear: when the steady state has q > 1; increasing the consumption of non-participants
provides a rst-order welfare benet; the only way to achieve this benet, absent scal instruments,
is monetary. As we show next, a quantitative analysis of optimal policy in a calibrated version of
our model suggests that ination volatility is desirable in this framework. Pursuing price stability
instead, even around an optimally chosen ination target, has large welfare costs.
As will become clear below, the optimal policy prescription is not to simply increase Ns consump-
tion; indeed, as we shall see other policies that imply higher consumption levels for N are suboptimal
because they imply too much volatility like in our analytical example above.
A second clarication is that ination, because of the Pigou e¤ect, is "bad" for N  it erodes the
value of their outstanding money balances. We shall see that ination can nevertheless be optimal,
despite this direct harmful e¤ect, when it is a side-e¤ect of liquidity used for insurance.
In Appendix B.7 we outline the main ingredients and implications of the model with endogenous
income of participants as in Bilbiie (2008, 2017), which delivers an additional "New Keynesian cross"
amplication channel. Therein, we show that the loss function in that model contains a linear term
in both cN and lN , namely hcNt   lNt . Thus, while there is a benet in that model to increasing
consumption of N, there is also a cost insofar as this insurance-expansion is sustained by the same
households working more hours. We will see that quantitatively this intuition implies that there will
be less incentives to accommodate ination, and less deviations from price stability in that model.41
5 Optimal Liquidity and Ination: a Quantitative Evalua-
tion
We calibrate the model at quarterly frequency and follow, for common parameters pertaining to
preferences and the supply side, the classic papers in optimal policy in NK models, Khan, King,
and Wollman (2003) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007): the inverse elasticity of labor supply is
' = 0:25, and  = 1. The elasticity of substitution between goods is " = 6, and we introduce the
40This is analogous to the linear benet of increasing output above the natural rate when the steady-state is
rst-order distorted in the standard New Keynesian model. See Woodford (2003; Ch. 6), Benigno and Woodford
(2005, 2012) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) for an analysis of this when the distortion pertains to monopolistic
distortion, i.e.  > 0; including explanations of the second-order corrections that are necessary to correctly evaluate
welfare.
41Other changes are that the weight on consumption volatility becomes '+ and the expression determining h and
q (and hence the size of the distortion) is more involved, as scal redistribution matters see Appendix.
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steady-state subsidy  = 1=(" 1) to avoid steady-state distortions due to monopolistic competition
thus isolating our novel channel as a motivation for deviations from price stability. Both cited papers
use di¤erent models of staggered pricing and assume that prices stay unchanged on average for 5
periods; this implies a Phillips curve slope (our  ) of around 0:05. Given our ", the price adjustment
cost parameter that delivers the same  is  = 100. The discount factor is  = 0:98, as in other
studies with heterogeneous agents (Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012; Curdia and Woodford, 2009);
we consider larger values for robustness below. We use the same labor productivity process as Khan
et al, with autocorrelation 0:95 and standard deviation 1%.
Three parameters pertain to market incompleteness and money demand: the probabilities to
keep participating () and non-participating (), and home production when non-participating (or
unemployment benets) . Since we perfectly correlated nancial market and labor market partici-
pation to obtain our tractable model, two calibrations are possible: one that targets nancial market
participation and money demand, and the other labor market variables. We use the former as a
benchmark and report the latter for robustness.
We target three data features in our benchmark calibration. First, the number of participants n:
in the US economy roughly half of the population participates in nancial markets, either directly or
indirectly (Bricker et al, 2014), and this is stable over time. We thus take n = 0:5, which implies the
restriction  = . Second, the velocity of money (roughly speaking,  1 in our notation): considering
a broad money aggregate, the quarterly velocity (GDP=M2) is around 2 over the period 1982 2007
(chosen to avoid the zero lower bound period). Third, consumption inequality q between participating
and non-participating agents captures the lack of insurance due to market incompleteness. Since
agents participate infrequently in nancial markets (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002) and one cannot keep
track of their participation status, it is hard to nd an exact empirical counterpart to q. We take as
a proxy the fall of nondurable consumption when becoming unemployed, which is estimated between
10% and 20% (see e.g. Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis, 2014) and target the conservative value
of 10% for this object (q 1   1 in our model). These three targets jointly imply  =  = 0:9, and
 = 0:783. Table 1 presents our parameters and the implied Ramsey steady-state values for our
target variables which are determined by the exact Ramsey equilibrium conditions outlined in the
Appendix.
5.1 Optimal long-run deviations from price stability
The optimal asymptotic (steady-state) ination rate is  =  0:79%. As expected, this is higher
than the ination implied by the Friedman Rule (which is  2%), because prices are sticky, just as in
standard monetary models with sticky prices, e.g. Khan et al (2003).42 More equilibrium deation
42Brunnemeier and Sannikov (2016) provide an example of a exible-price monetary model where the Friedman rule
is not optimal, because there is a distorted portfolio decision between money and physical capital.
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occurs if prices are more exible, labor is more elastic, and  is higher. The rst two elements are
standard (the former was rst noticed by Chari Christiano Kehoe, 1997; see also Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe, 2004). The last part has a standard interpretation too: at given n; higher  implies more
elastic money demand. As we will show below, less elastic money demand (lower   n) implies less
optimal deation as in Khan, King and Wollman, although for a di¤erent theory of money demand.
Preferences Production and price setting Heterogeneity
  ' "  a a   
0:98 1 0:25 6 100 0:95 0:01 0:9 0:9 0:78
Model outcome
GDP/M2 n (cN cP )=cP  cp cN l mtot q
2 50%  11%  0:79% 0:98 0:87 1:07 0:46 1:12
Table 1: Baseline calibration
What is the welfare cost of (steady-state) ination? This is a classic question in monetary eco-
nomics, going back at least to Baileys 1956 calculation.43 We calculate this (in the Lucas 1987
tradition): in our economy, moving from a steady-state annualized ination rate of 2% (0:5% quar-
terly) to the optimal rate of  3:2% ( 0:79% quarterly) is equivalent to a permanent increase in
consumption of 0:61% in line with (although slightly larger numbers than) e.g. Lucas (2000) and
Imorohoglu (1992), although slightly larger.
Our models implications for optimal policy in the long run are thus rather standard. But in the
short run, things are di¤erent and this is intimately related to the lack of insurance in our model: with
long-run inequality (q = 1:12), the steady state is distorted and this has implications for short-run
optimal policy.
5.2 Optimal short-run deviations from price stability
The liquidity-insurance channel requires the central bank to accommodate some ination volatility,
as doing otherwise leads to large welfare losses. This is true in our economy even when the source
of business cycles is a shock that, in the standard NK model with money demand but no inequality
(insurance), generates no such trade-o¤: a plain-vanilla labor productivity shock.
Recall what happens in the baseline NK model in response to this shock: not much. A welfare-
maximizing central bank keeps prices unchanged and ination at zero, as this shock creates no
43A large literature analyzed this question using a variety of frameworks. To cite just some prominent examples,
Lucas (2000) found that reducing ination from 10 to 0 percent annually results in a 1 percent increase in consumption.
Analyzing a monetary framework closer in spirit to the one our model embeds (based on the Bewley model), Imorohoglu
(1992) showed that the welfare e¤ects of ination are larger in incomplete-markets economies. See Doepke and
Schneider (2006), Erosa and Ventura (2002) and Ragot (2014) for reviews.
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trade-o¤: the central bank can close the output gap costlessly, a well-known result labeled "divine
coincidence" by Blanchard and Galí (2007). This result changes but only slightly when the steady
state is distorted ( > 0 in our notation), as analyzed in detail by Benigno and Woodford (2005):
productivity shocks then have a "cost-push" dimension, creating a trade-o¤. Quantitatively, however,
this is moot subject to one caveat mentioned in the next footnote. The same is true in models
incorporating a variety of other frictions in particular, in models with monetary frictions such as
Khan, King, and Wollman (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004, 2007): price stability is a
robust policy prescription. Even though these models do imply ination volatility under the optimal
Ramsey policy, the welfare cost of eliminating such volatility is generically negligible.44
This is no longer the case in our model: optimal Ramsey policy requires volatile ination, and this
volatility matters for welfare. To see the rst part of this argument, consider the impulse responses
to a productivity shock presented in Figure 1, for three economies. With a black solid line, we have
our economy under optimal policy obtained by solving (23). With a blue dashed line, we have our
monetary economy under what we label "Strict ination targeting" (SIT): the central bank perfectly
stabilizes ination around the Ramsey-optimal steady state ination (this is implemented by a Taylor
rule with large  and the optimal 
 target). Finally, we show with a red circle line optimal policy
in a standard cashless equilibrium,45 a comparison with which illustrates the extent of risk-sharing
provided by money in our model. All variables are in percentage deviation from steady state, except
the ination and interest rates, which are in deviation from steady state.
44See for instance Table 2 in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007); see also Bilbiie, Fujiwara, and Ghironi (2014) for
a result on optimal short-run price stability in a model with entry and variety, and a review of the literature using
other distortions. As Benigno nd Woodford (2005) show analytically, this result changes price stability ceases to be
optimal if, on top of  > 0; the share of government spending in steady-state output is also non-zero.
45Since in the non-monetary equilibrium the steady-state ination rate is 0, we recalibrated it to have the same
steady state allocation. In particular, we reduce output by 2
2 and introduce a transfer between N and P households,
such that the steady-state consumption and labor supply are the same in the monetary and non-monetary equilibrium,
and only the steady-state ination is di¤erent.
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Figure 1: Responses to a labor productivity shock under optimal Ramsey policy in our model (solid black),
strict ination targeting in our model (blue dash), and optimal policy in cashless model (red circles).
The responses of the cashless model are standard: ination does not move, and output is equal
to its natural rate. Since labor productivity a¤ects only P , their consumption increases (and so does
inequality), and the nominal interest rate goes down.
In our monetary economy, the planner provides insurance: compared to the red circle line, the
black solid line shows that the consumption of N increases (inequality decreases). The planner
provides liquidity and interest rates fall; the result is ination (due to the demand e¤ect on rms),
which erodes Ns purchasing power (money balances) via the Pigou e¤ect.
Consider now the allocation when this ination is absent (blue dashed line): more liquidity is
issued, and the real value of balances is much higher: thus, the consumption of N responds more, and
is more volatile. Since the consumption of P is largely unchanged, the same is true for inequality-
insurance. We will now show that this extra volatility is costly in terms of aggregate welfare.46
46It is by now well known, starting with the inuential paper of King and Wolman (1999), that welfare calculations
depend crucially upon the initial values of the Lagrange multipliers which can be set to 0, or to their Ramsey steady-
state values.Under the former choice, policy is not timeless-optimal: initial period t0 ination has no consequence
for prior expectations, thus the policy chosen in any later period is not a continuation of t0 policy. In the second
case, policy is timeless-optimal in the sense of King and Wolman (1999) and Khan et al.(2003) (Woodford 2003 uses
a di¤erent denition). The numers we report are for the former, t0-optimal case; in the timeless-optimal case, the
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Table 2 reports the standard deviations of the main variables for the (Ramsey-)optimal and
SIT allocation. The volatility of ination is comparable to that obtained by Khan et al (2003).
Because of limited risk-sharing, Ns consumption volatility is higher than P s. More importantly,
Ns consumption volatility is higher under strict ination targeting than under optimal policy as
a result, the volatility of our inequality measure is twice as large. This di¤erence in volatilities
translates into a large welfare cost of price stability (around the optimal asymptotic ination rate):
households need to be compensated by 0:08% of consumption every period in order to live in an
economy with stable prices, rather than in one with optimal policy and ination volatility where
we calculate these welfare costs following closely the method detailed in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2007).47
Why do we qualify the welfare cost as "large"? The number should be compared with the welfare
cost of eliminating business cycles, that is of providing the household with a certain (zero-volatility)
consumption path, instead of the Ramsey-optimal but volatile path of consumption. That number, in
our economy, is very small: that is less than 0:001%, even though consumption volatility is comparable
to the data and to Lucas (1987), i.e. around 3% standard deviation.48 In other words, the welfare
cost of price stability is about 100 (one hundred) times or two orders of magnitude larger than
the welfare cost of business cycle volatility in our model.
The reason for these high welfare costs of price stability is by now, we hope, clear: our long-run
equilibrium is one with imperfect insurance (inequality), which for a planner is a distortion and
implies a motive to provide liquidity. This distortion su¢ ces to generate signicant costs of price
stability in our model, because volatility has a rst-order welfare e¤ect through the level of Ns
consumption. In terms of our second-order approximation, this e¤ect makes it "as if" the weight on
ination volatility in true Ramsey loss function were smaller than :
welfare losses are very close to zero in all cases; ses also Bilbiie, Fujiwara, and Ghironi (2014) for further discussion in
a di¤erent context.
47The welfare losses are similar for the two types of agents: thus, our simplied heterogeneity misses some of the
distributional e¤ects emphasized by Krusell and Smith (1998) in their framework and the subsequent literature (see
Lucas 2003 for a review) the welfare benets of eliminating uncertainty are asymmetric among the poor, the rich, and
the middle class. One would expect that such an asymmetry occurs in a richer model of the wealth distribution also
for the welfare costs that we calculate.
48Recall that the standard Lucas (1987, 2003) calculation delivering a cost of business cycles of 0:05% (still smaller
than the cost of price stability here) is performed in a competitive, real model with exogenous labor. We argue
that the right metric for assessing the benet of eliminating business cycles is the same measure calculated for our
Ramsey economy (any other assumption on policy will a fortiori be arbitrary). Recall also that the cost of business
cycle measure is very sensitive to labor supply elasticity indeed, business cycle volatility can even be benecial in a
standard RBC model with elastic labor. The welfare cost of uctuations in a competitive version of our economy with
inelastic labor and xed money supply is 0.024%.
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Standard deviation (%) Welfare (%)
Economies c^P c^N q^  W
Baseline
Ramsey 2:6 2:9 0:7 0:05  
SIT 2:5 3:3 1:3 0 0:08
No SS inequality ( ! 1)
Ramsey 2:5 3:1 0:6 0:05  
SIT 2:5 3:8 1:3 0 0:00
Table 2: Standard deviations and welfare losses (percent)
That small ination volatility translates into high welfare gains in our model is due not so much to
volatility itself as to imperfect insurance (inequality). To illustrate this, consider an economy where
the steady-state distortion vanishes, q ! 1, which amounts to taking  ! 1 and re-calibrating  to
get the same steady-state money velocity; evidently, the optimal long-run ination rate converges to
0. As the bottom panel of Table 2 illustrates, the volatility of ination under Ramsey policy in this
economy is unchanged. Nevertheless, this volatility no longer means welfare: without a liquidity-
insurance motive, the central bank can safely and costlessly pursue price stability (just as in Khan
et al, 2003, and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2007).
Robustness 1: Di¤erent Supply Calibrations
As a rst robustness check we report the same outcomes for economies with more exible prices
( = 50) and less elastic labor (' = 1).49 The upper panel of Table 3 contains the results. Both the
ination volatility and its welfare benet increase as prices become more exible and labor supply
more elastic. The reason is that with more exible prices (lower ), the cost of using ination is
lower: in the limit, as prices become exible, ination essentially becomes a lump-sum tax an
insight originally due to Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1997) and also discussed by Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2004).
49For each economy, in order to perform meaningful welfare comparisons we calibrate the discount factor  and
home production , to start from the same steady state: this gives 0:973 and 0:79 for the rst and 0:982 and 0:765 for
the second calibration (results are similar when we keep these parameters unchanged).
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Standard deviation (%) Welfare (%) W
Economies SS(%) c^P c^N q^  HD ! SIT
 = 50  1:54 Ramsey 2:7 3:2 0:5 0:08  
SIT 2:6 3:8 1:2 0 0:13
' = 1  0:6 Ramsey 2:1 2:7 0:6 0:04  
SIT 2:0 3:0 0:9 0 0:03
Labor market calibration  0:36 Ramsey 3:0 5:1 2:1 0:02  
( = 0:95;  = 0:5;  = 0:5) SIT 3:1 5:5 2:4 0 0:06
New Keynesian Cross  0:37 Ramsey 2:8 3:3 1:1 0:02  
SIT 2:8 3:5 1:4 0 0:02
Table 3: Robustness analysis
Robustness 2: Di¤erent Demand-Side Calibration
The second alternative calibration we consider is based on labor market risk. Instead of matching
nancial market variables (n; ; and q) as in our previous calibration, we draw on the labor market
literature, in particular Shimer (2005) to nd parameter values for ; ; and . At quarterly frequency,
the job loss probability is 5% and the average job nding probability 50% for the post-war period
these two numbers imply  = 0:95;  = 0:5 and thus n = 0:94; the gross replacement ratio is set
to =w = 50% (see also Challe and Ragot, 2014). The middle panel of Table 3 contains the results,
assuming that all other parameters are as in the baseline; apart from the reported numbers, it is
worth mentioning that the quarterly velocity of money is somewhat higher (2:33), and the fall in
consumption when becoming unemployed is now 24% in the upper range of the empirical estimates
discussed above.
The optimal steady-state ination rate is  0:36%: there is less deation than in the baseline
calibration, for there is less money in circulation. This is similar to the optimal deation rate obtained
by Khan et al for their calibration with low money demand elasticity (obtained by estimating money
demand over a shorter sample); indeed, since  is very close to n, our calibration also implies low
money demand elasticity. The similarities go further: as in that model, optimal policy also implies
lower ination volatility under this calibration; but the parallel stops here, for this smaller volatility
is still associated with a large welfare cost in our model. households are willing to sacrice 0:06%
of consumption every period in order to live in an economy with optimally volatile ination, rather
than in an economy with stable prices. Our result thus survives even in this economy with very low
idiosyncratic risk calibrated to labor market data.
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Robustness 3: Adding the New Keynesian Cross Channel
The bottom panel of Table 3 adds the New Keynesian cross channel by making labor supply of N
elastic and their income endogenous; constrained households thus have an additional margin to self-
insure in face of shocks. Notice that the subsidy to rms is paid by taxing all households uniformly
(otherwise, there is no reason to self-insure through money in the steady-state equilibrium) In this
economy, there is the additional amplication e¤ect through the "New Keynesian cross" mentioned
above (see Appendix B.7) and described in detail in Bilbiie (2008, 2017). Furthermore, steady-state
inequality is higher because there is less scal redistribution (under our calibration, the consumption
di¤erence is 16%) so the distortion is larger. Monetary policy is more powerful, and there is
also more insurance through the labor margin and hence less need to self-insure. In addition, as
emphasized above, a linear term in the welfare function now penalizes expansions that are labor-
driven, even when they provide insurance. In equilibrium, there is thus less ination and ination
volatility because the liquidity-insurance motive is weaker. Consequently, the welfare costs of price
stability are smaller but they are still much larger (30 times larger) than the welfare costs of Ramsey
cycles (which are again very small, smaller than 0:001%).
Robustness 4: Adding the Markup Distortion
All our previous calibrations assumed that there is an optimal subsidy that undoes the steady-state
monopolistic distortion,  = 0; this allows isolating the novel channel that operates in our framework.
We now report one last set of robustness checks, assuming that there is no such subsidy  = 0:
Economies SS(%) sd()(%) W0
Baseline  1:54 0:06 0:48
 = 50  2:6 0:1 0:55
' = 1  0:1 0:04 0:15
 ! 1  0:7 0:05 0
Labor Market  0:6 0:02 0:33
NK Cross  0:4 0:02 0:16
Table 4: A distorted steady state,  = 0
As Table 4 shows, the welfare losses are now much larger, about ve to seven times. The notable
exception is the case when there is long-run insurance (no steady-state inequality): the welfare
loss is, again, zero as our second-order approximation showed, the linear term in the loss function
disappears in this case. The two long-run distortions are thus complementary in generating signicant
losses from price stability. This result is related to Benigno and Woodford (2005), who showed that
a distorted steady state implies signicant deviations from price stability only when the steady-state
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government spending share is non-zero. Our framework thus identies another channel which, when
shut o¤, makes price stability again optimal even when the monopolistic distortion is large. But when
our liquidity-insurance channel is at work (q > 1), the optimal deviations from price stability are
very large indeed if supply-side distortions are also an issue ( > 0).
6 Open-Market Operations
In our model, it makes a di¤erence whether monetary policy is conducted via helicopter drops or
open market operations. What are the implications for optimal monetary policy, and which means of
issuing money is preferable from a welfare standpoint? To answer this question, we now assume that
instead of money being injected through a transfer, it is exchanged for bonds through open market
operations OM. We maintain a consolidated budget constraint for the government:
mtott+1 + bt+1 +  t =
1
1 + t
mtott +
1 + it 1
1 + t
bt (24)
where  t are taxes, and bt+1 debt (when negative, these are assets). Using that money created by
the central bank (money growth, or seigniorage) is given as before by (10) and replacing, we obtain:
bt+1 +  t + xt =
1 + it 1
1 + t
bt (25)
The way of money creation is dictated by how taxes/transfers adjust when money is introduced
xt > 0. At one extreme we have the previous case of HD (within-period transfer  t =  xt). As
another extreme, consider OM with one-period repayment: no transfer within the period  t = 0 but
all debt gets repaid next period (to be precise, when money is issued and exchanged for bonds, this
amounts not to repayment but to collecting, and transferring the proceeds):
 t+1 =
1 + it
1 + t+1

 xt + 1 + it 1
1 + t
bt

: (26)
The general case consists of a "tax rule" that ensures that the intertemporal budget equation holds
as a constraint for any price level (Leeper, 1991; Woodford, 1996; see Leeper and Leith, 2016 for
a review) we outline this in the Appendix for completion. Insofar as optimal policy is concerned,
however, the one-period-repayment case happens to also be the one that delivers the highest welfare
with the class of OM policies; this is intuitive, because as we shall see OM imposes further constraints
on the amount of insurance that monetary policy can achieve, and the faster the repayment, the better
the insurance properties.
To understand the key di¤erence between HD and OM, consider the budget constraint of N under
OM with one-period repayment:
cNt =  +
1 + it 1
1 + t
xt 1 +
1  
n
mtott
1 + t
(27)
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Monetary policy a¤ects demand of N through two channels. First, the real balance, Pigou e¤ect
operates, regardless of the means of money creation: ination erodes the real value of money balances,
although the equilibrium ination is di¤erent under HD and OM. Second, there is the key di¤erence
between HD and OM: period t money creation (xt) in the HD case relaxes the budget constraint of
N within the period, whereas in the OM case it a¤ects the budget constraint of N -households only
starting from the following period.
This implies that the Pigou e¤ect does more work under OM, for it needs to compensate for the
lack of a transfer: equilibrium ination volatility is larger than under HD. When ination volatility
is costless (under exible prices), this is largely irrelevant: both OM and HD allow reaching the same
optimal allocation. But when prices are sticky and ination is costly, a clear di¤erence between OM
and HD emerges, with important welfare consequences.
For a welfare-maximizing central bank, this implies that there are additional instruments and
constraints. In particular, the Ramsey problem now ought to include both new money xt and
nominal interest it as instruments; the additional constraints for the Ramsey planner are the budget
constraint of N under OM (27), the Euler equation for bonds (5) and the denition of money growth
(10).
We compute Ramsey policy when monetary policy is conducted via OM with one-period re-
payment and assess the optimal way of money creation.50 Figure 2 illustrates the responses to a
TFP shock under OM Ramsey policy, comparing them to the responses under HD Ramsey already
illustrated in Figure 1.
50Numerical results support our previous intuition that this policy arrangement (with one-period repayment, i.e.
b = 1) delivers the highest welfare within the class of OM policies; this biases the results in favor of OM, that is it
provides a lower bound on its welfare costs relative to HD.
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Figure 2: Responses to a labor productivity shock under optimal Ramsey policy with (solid black), versus
OM with one-period repayment (blue dash).
A rst main di¤erence between HD and OM (illustrating the more general discussion above) is
that when money is created by OM cN does not move on impact, but increases sharpy only one period
after the shock in contrast to HD where it increases on impact. In other words, there is more risk-
sharing for the aggregate risk when money is created under HD (albeit only on impact): we assess
below the welfare cost generated by this di¤erence. A second, related di¤erence concerns ination,
which under OM rst falls before increasing sharply (whereas it is much smoother under HD).51 With
OM, there is deation today to provide insurance and increase cN because the transfer cannot be
used, in other words, the Pigou e¤ect needs to bear the adjustment. But there is also expected
ination, which increases cP through the interest rate channel, i.e. intertemporal substitution. The
planner ought to do this too, since otherwise P are hurt by deation today, and the planners ultimate
objective is insurance. This generates volatile ination under OM compared to HD.52
51A "production"-based explanation is as follows. Monetary policy under OM does not increase the consumption of
N on impact, so aggregate demand under OM is lower than under HD (see total consumption c), and so is aggregate
production: in fact, labor (not pictured) falls on impact under OM, while it increases under HD. Due to this labor
market response, the real wage falls under OM and increases slightly under HD. Through the Phillips curve, this
translates on impact into deation under OM, and almost constant ination under HD.
52The immediate switch from deation to ination under OM occurs because we assume one-period bonds and the
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In a nutshell, aggregate demand is (optimally) more cyclical under HD, because money is trans-
ferred to non-participating households who have a high marginal propensity to consume. This trans-
lates into a more stable ination under HD than under OM. Monetary policy through OM tries to
make up for the lack of an instant transfer by exploiting the Pigou e¤ect through ination, which
has perverse e¤ects and can have large welfare costs. It is intuitive that, since monetary policy has a
redistributive role in our model, HD is a preferable way to issue money because it has better insur-
ance properties: it provides a direct transfer within the period, and it does not imply (ine¢ ciently)
relying upon the Pigou e¤ect to do the job. The question we ask is: how large is this? What is the
welfare gain of switching, in response to the same shock, from OM to HD? In all economies we stud-
ied, this welfare cost is "large" especially compared to the small ( ~0:001%) benet of eliminating
volatility reported above. As Table 5 shows, it ranges from 0:01% under the baseline model to above
0:05% in an economy with endogenous N labor and a distorted steady state (compared to the cost
of business cycle volatility measured in these economies, these numbers are 10 and respectively 50
times larger one to two orders of magnitude).
Std. dev. (%) Welfare (%) W
Open-Market Ramsey SS (%) c^P c^N q^  OM ! HD
Baseline
e¢ cient SS  0:79 2:6 2:7 1:1 0:05 0:01
distorted SS  1:54 2:2 2:5 1:0 0:07 0:026
NK cross
e¢ cient SS  0:37 3:1 3:7 1:6 0:12 0:01
distorted SS  0:41 2:7 3:1 1:5 0:09 0:052
Table 5. Ramsey OM: Standard deviations and welfare losses
Using our previous computations, we can also assess the welfare costs of price stability instead of
following the Ramsey-optimal policy, but conducted through OM. These follow directly by subtract-
ing from the numbers in the last column of Table 5 the relevant number from Tables 2, 3 and 4. We
thus obtain, for the same four cases as in Table 5: 0:07; 0:45; 0:01; and 0:11 respectively.
7 Conclusions
In monetary policy analysis, a new synthesis looms: the integration of sticky-price, New Keynesian
models and models of heterogeneous households, incomplete markets and limited participation. This
transfer of cental bank prots takes place within one period. Changing these assumptions would deliver a smoother
path, but the intuition would be the same: rst deate, then inate (because what matters for for P agents is the
"long" rate).
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very active research area (reviewed in the Introduction) started in the early 2000s and is going at full
speed. We hope to have contributed to these convergence e¤orts a fully-edged, NK-style optimal
monetary policy analysis, in a tractable framework that captures key mechanisms of heterogeneous-
agent incomplete-markets models and includes a deep reason for money as a self-insurance device.
Liquidity and insurance (a limited notion of inequality) are intimately related in our model: todays
liquidity (lower interest rates) implies tomorrows insurance (and lower inequality). Aggregate de-
mand in this model depends on: money, or liquidity, which relaxes the constraint of non-participating
households and provides a saving vehicle for participating households; interest, because of intertempo-
ral substitution by participating households; and prices, or ination, because a Pigou e¤ect operates
for non-participating households, and (expected) ination is the relevant return for holding liquidity
for participants.
The link between liquidity and insurance is the keystone for optimal monetary policy in this
model: a novel trade-o¤ arises between providing liquidity for insurance purposes, and stabilization
of ination and real activity. We rst illustrate this trade-o¤ analytically by means of a second-
order approximation to the aggregate welfare function, in the New Keynesian tradition pioneered
by Woodford (2003): there is a rst-order benet to providing insurance, insofar as the long-run
equilibrium is characterized by a lack thereof (that is, by long-run consumption inequality). This
rst-order benet of liquidity provision implies that the standard objective of eliminating ination
volatility take a back seat.
A quantitative assessment of this trade-o¤ shows that in an economy with a long-run equilibrium
characterized by imperfect insurance (consumption inequality), deviations from price stability are
optimal. This holds, rst, in the long run: the optimal ination target should be between zero and
the Friedman rule; this is no surprise it is true in most monetary models. But in our framework,
unlike in others, it is also true in the short run. Optimal policy implies ination volatility in response
to (productivity) shocks that otherwise create no trade-o¤.
What is more, this volatility matters for welfare. A policy of stabilizing prices (albeit around the
optimal ination target) incurs a large welfare loss. This happens because short-run volatility has
a rst-order e¤ect on constrained households: optimal policy requires giving less weight to ination
stabilization which de facto implies giving more weight to constrained households.
This cannot be emphasized enough: the optimal policy prescription is not that the central bank
should or needs to do anything radically di¤erent from what central banks are currently doing.
Instead, it describes how, within that existing policy framework, this novel liquidity-insurance motive
can be reinterpreted as a quantitative modication of the central bankspolicy objectives namely,
more tolerance to ination volatility when this is a side-e¤ect of liquidity provision.
While we view our study as a step in the direction of the new synthesis that we mention at the
outset of these concluding comments, we think such e¤orts should continue, for much remains to be
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done. Our tractable framework allows the calculation of optimal policy, but it inherently leaves out
several other, surely important redistributive aspects of monetary policy acknowledged in Section 2.1.
Incorporating some of these other "HANK" channels (more realistic wealth distributions; endogenous
portfolio shares; nominal debt; endogenous unemployment risk; etc.) is paramount in order to attain
a thorough understanding of how monetary policy works and how it should be conducted in a world
where household heterogeneity matters.
8 References
Adao, B., I. Correia, and P. Teles, 2003. "Gaps and Triangles," Review of Economic Studies, 70(4), 699-713
Adam, K. and J. Zhu, 2014 "Price Level Changes and the Redistribution of Nominal Wealth Across the
Euro Area" Journal of the European Economic Association
Adam, K. and P. Tzamourani, 2016, Distributional Consequences of Asset Price Ination in the Euro
Area, European Economic Review, 89, 172192.
Algan, Y. and X. Ragot. 2010., "Monetary Policy with Heterogeneous Agents and Borrowing Con-
straints." Review of Economic Dynamics, 13, 295-316.
Algan, Y., E. Challe and X. Ragot, 2010. "Incomplete Markets and the Output-Ination Trade-o¤",
Economic Theory, 46(1), 2011, 55-84
Alvarez F., A. Atkeson and C. Edmond. 2009. "Sluggish Responses of Prices and Ination to Monetary
Shocks in an Inventory Model of Money Demand." The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol.
124(3), pages 911-967, August.
Alvarez, F., A. Atkeson and P. J. Kehoe. 2002. "Money, Interest Rates, and Exchange Rates with
Endogenously Segmented Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(1),
pages 73-112, February.
Alvarez, F. and A. Atkeson, 1997. "Money and exchange rates in the Grossman-Weiss-Rotemberg
model." Journal of Monetary Economics 40(3), pages 619-640, December.
Alvarez, F. and F. Lippi. 2009. Financial Innovation and the Transactions Demand for Cash.Econo-
metrica 77 (2): 363402.
Alvarez, F. and F. Lippi. 2014. "The demand of liquid assets with uncertain lumpy expenditures."
Journal of Monetary Economics, forthcoming.
Alvarez, F. and F. Lippi. 2014. "Persistent Liquidity E¤ects and Long-Run Money Demand." American
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 6(2), 71-107, April.
Andrés, J., O. Arce and C. Thomas, 2013, "Banking competition, collateral constraints, and optimal
monetary policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 45(s2)
Auclert, A. 2016, "Monetary Policy and the Redistribution Channel" Mimeo Stanford
39
Bailey, M., 1956, "The Welfare Cost of Inationary Finance", Journal of Political Economy, 64(2),
93-110
Bayer, C., R. Luetticke, L. Pham-Dao, and V. Tjaden, 2017, "Precautionary Savings, Illiquid Assets,
and the Aggregate Consequences of Shocks to Household Income Risk" Mimeo Bonn GSE
Benigno, P., and M. Woodford. 2005. Ination Stabilization and Welfare: The Case of a Distorted
Steady State.Journal of the European Economic Association, 3(6): 11851236.
Benigno, P., and M. Woodford. 2012. Linear-Quadratic Approximation of Optimal Policy Problems.
Journal of Economic Theory, 147(1): 142.
Bernanke, B. S. 2007, "The Level and Distribution of Economic Well-Being," speech delivered at the
Greater Omaha Chamber of Commerce, Omaha, Nebraska
Bernanke, B. S. 2015, "Monetary Policy and Inequality", Brookings.edu
Bewley, T. F. 1977. "The Permanent Income Hypothesis: A Theoretical Formulation". Journal of
Economic Theory 16: 25292
Bewley, T. F. 1983 "A Di¢ culty with the Optimum Quantity of Money" Econometrica, 1983, 51(5),
1485-504
Bhandari, A., D. Evans, M. Golosov, and T. Sargent, 2017, "Optimal Fiscal-Monetary Policy with
Redistribution", Mimeo
Bilbiie F. O. 2004. "Limited Asset Market Participation, Monetary Policy, and (Inverted) Keynesian
Logic", Working Paper Nu¢ eld College, Oxford University
Bilbiie F. O. 2008. "Limited Asset Market Participation, Monetary Policy, and (Inverted) Aggregate
Demand Logic." Journal of Economic Theory 140, 162-196.
Bilbiie, F.O., 2017, "The New Keynesian Cross: Understanding Monetary Policy with Hand-to-Mouth
Households", Mimeo PSE.
Bilbiie, F. O., I. Fujiwara, and F. Ghironi, 2014, "Optimal Monetary Policy with Endogenous Entry and
Product Variety." Journal of Monetary Economics, 64, 1-20
Bilbiie, F.O., and R. Straub, 2012, "Changes in the Output Euler Equation and Asset Markets Partici-
pation" Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 36(11), 1659-1672
Bilbiie F. O. and R. Straub, 2013, "Asset Market Participation, Monetary Policy Rules and the Great
Ination", Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(2), pp 377-392
Bilbiie F. O., T. Monacelli and R. Perotti 2013, Public Debt and Redistribution with Borrowing Con-
straints", The Economic Journal 2013, F64-F98, 02
Bilbiie, F.O. and X. Ragot, 2017, Liquidity, Aggregate Demand, and Interest Rate Rules", Mimeo
Braun, A. and T. Nakajima, 2012. "Uninsured Countercyclical Risk: An Aggregation Result And
Application To Optimal Monetary Policy," Journal of the European Economic Association, 10(6), 1450-
1474.
Bricker, J., L. Dettling, A. Henriques, J. Hsu, K. Moore, J. Sabelhaus, J. Thompson, and R. Windle.
40
2014. Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2010 to 2013: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer
Finances,Federal Reserve Bulletin, 100(4).
Brunnermeier, M. K., and Y. Sannikov. 2016. On the Optimal Ination Rate.American Economic
Review Papers and Proceedings
Cao, S, C. A. Meh, J.V. R¬os-Rull and Y. Terajima. 2012. "Ination, Demand for Liquidity and
Welfare", Working Paper.
Campbell, J. Y. and Mankiw, N. G. 1989. Consumption, Income, and Interest Rates: Reinterpreting
the Time Series Evidence, in Blanchard, O. and Fisher, S., eds, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 185-216,
MIT Press.
Challe, E., 2017, "Uninsured unemployment risk and optimal monetary policy," Mimeo Ecole Polytech-
nique
Challe, E. and X. Ragot, 2014 Precautionary Saving Over the Business Cycle,The Economic Journal.
Challe, E; Ragot, X. Matheron, J. and J. Rubio-Ramirez, (2016), "Precautionary saving and aggregate
demand", Quantitative Economics, Forthcoming
Chari,V.V., L.J. Christiano, and P.J. Kehoe, 1991, Optimal scal and monetary policy: some recent
results, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 23 519539.
Christiano, L. J., 1991 "Modelling the Liquidity E¤ect of a Monetary Shock" Quarterly Review Min-
neapolis Fed
Christiano, L. J. and M. Eichenbaum 1992. "Liquidity e¤ects and the monetary transmission mecha-
nism." American Economic Review PP
Christiano, L. J. and M. Eichenbaum 1995. "Liquidity e¤ects, monetary policy and the business cycle."
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 27(4,1): 1113-1136.
Christiano, L. J., M. Eichenbaum and C. Evans, 2005, "Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic E¤ects of
a Shock to Monetary Policy," Journal of Political Economy, 113(1): 1-45
Chodorow-Reich, G. and L. Karabarbounis 2014, The Cyclicality of the Opportunity Cost of Employ-
ment,Mimeo Harvard.
Clarida, R., J. Galí and M. Gertler, 1999, "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspec-
tive," Journal of Economic Literature, 37 1661-1707
Cloyne, J., C. Ferreira, and P. Surico 2015 "Monetary Policy when Households have Debt: New Evidence
on the Transmission Mechanism" CEPR Discussion Paper
Curé, B. 2012, What can monetary policy do about inequality? Speech at Extreme Poverty and
Human Rights, Fourth World Committee, European Parliament, Brussels
Coibion, O., Y. Gorodnichenko, L. Kueng and J. Silvia. 2012. "Innocent Bystanders? Monetary Policy
and Inequality in the U.S", Forthcoming, Journal of Monetary Economics.
Correia, I. and P. Teles 1999, "The optimal ination tax", Review of Economic Dynamics.
41
Cui, W. and S. Radde, 2016, "Search-Based Endogenous Asset Liquidity and the Macroeconomy",
Mimeo UCL and ECB
Curdia, V. and M. Woodford, 2009, "Credit Frictions and Optimal Monetary Policy", Forthcoming,
Journal of Monetary Economics.
Den Haan,W., Rendahl, P. and M. Riegler 2016, "Unemployment (Fears) and Deationary Spirals",
working paper.
Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report (2016), Distributional E¤ects of Monetary Policy, September
2016.
Doepke, M. and M. Schneider 2006, "Ination and the Redistribution of Nominal Wealth", Journal of
Political Economy 114 (6), 1069-97
Draghi, M., 2016 Stability, Equity and Monetary Policy2nd DIW Europe Lecture, DIW Berlin
Eggertsson G. and P. Krugman 2012, "Debt, Deleveraging, and the Liquidity Trap: A Fisher-Minsky-
Koo Approach, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(3): 1469-1513.
Erosa, A., Ventura,G. 2002. "On Ination as a Regressive Consumption Tax." Journal of Monetary
Economics 49, 761-795.
Feldman, M and Gilles, C. 1985. "An Expository note on Individual risk without aggregate uncertainty."
Journal of Economic Theory 35, 26-32.
Friedman, M. 1969, The Optimum Quantity of Money, Macmillan
Fuerst, T. 1992. "Liquidity, loanable funds and economic activity." Journal of Monetary Economy
29(1),3-24.
Furceri, D., P. Loungani,and A. Zdzienicka, 2016 "The E¤ects of Monetary Policy Shocks on Inequality"
International Monetary Fund Working Paper
Galí, J. 2008, "Monetary Policy, Ination, and the Business Cycle: An Introduction to the New Keyne-
sian Framework and Its Applications", Princeton University Press
Galí, J., Lopez-Salido D. and J. Valles. 2004. "Rule-of-Thumb Consumers and the Design of Interest
Rate Rules." Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 36(4), 739-764.
Galí, J., D. López-Salido, and J. Vallés, 2007. "Understanding the E¤ects of Government Spending on
Consumption". Journal of the European Economic Association, March, vol. 5 (1), 227-270.
Gorea, D. and V. Midrigan, 2017, "Liquidity Constraints in the U.S. Housing Market." Mimeo NYU
Gornemann, N., K. Kuester, and M. Nakajima, 2012 Monetary Policy with Heterogeneous Agents,
Working Papers 12-21, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Gottlieb, C. 2015, "On the Distributive E¤ects of Ination" Mimeo EUI and Oxford
Green, E. 1994. "Individual-level randomness in a nonatomic population", working paper.
Grossman S.J and Weiss L. 1983. "A transactions-based model of the monetary transmission mecha-
nism." American Economic Review. 73 (1983). 871-880.
42
Iacoviello, M., 2005 House Prices, Borrowing Constraints, and Monetary Policy in the Business Cycle,
American Economic Review
Imrohoroglu, A., 1992. The welfare cost of ination under imperfect insurance. Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control 16, 79-91.
Ireland, P. 1996. "The role of countercyclical monetary policy." Journal of Political Economy 104(4),
704-723.
Jappelli, T and Pistaferri, L, 2014, "Fiscal Policy and MPC Heterogeneity", American Economic Journal:
Macroeconomics, 6(4), 107-36
Kaplan, G. and G. Violante, 2014 A Model of the Consumption Response to Fiscal Stimulus Payments,
Econometrica
Kaplan, G., G. Violante, and J. Weidner, 2014 The Wealthy Hand-to-Mouth,Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity.
Kaplan, G., B. Moll and G. Violante 2015, "Monetary Policy According to HANK", mimeo Princeton
and NYU
Kehoe, T., D. Levine, and M. Woodford, 1992, The optimum quantity of money revisited, in Partha
Dasgupta, Douglas Gale, Oliver Hart, and Eric Maskin, editors, The Economic Analysis of Markets and
Games: Essays in Honor of Frank Hahn, MIT Press, 1992, 50126.
Khan, A., R. G. King, and A. L. Wolman 2003. Optimal Monetary Policy. Review of Economic
Studies, 70(4), 825-860.
Khan, A. and J. Thomas 2011. "Ination and Interest Rates with Endogenous Market Segmentation",
working paper.
King, R. G., and A. L. Wolman, 1999 What Should the Monetary Authority Do When Prices are
Sticky?,in John B. Taylor, editor, Monetary Policy Rules, The University of Chicago Press, 1999, 349-398.
Kiyotaki, N. and J. Moore, 1997 "Credit Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, 105 (1997), 211-248
Kiyotaki, N and M. Gertler, 2010. "Financial Intermediation and Credit Policy in Business Cycle
Analysis," in Handbook of Monetary Economics, Volume 3A, eds B. Friedman and M.Woodford, Amsterdam:
Elsevier
Kiyotaki, N. and J. Moore, 2012, "Liquidity, Business Cycles, and Monetary Policy," mimeo Princeton
Krueger, D., K. Mitman and F. Perri, 2017, "Macroeconomics and Household Heterogeneity, Including
Inequality", Handbook of Macroeconomics, Vol 2B, chapter 11
Krusell, P. and A. Smith. 1998. "Income and wealth heterogeneity in the macroeconomy." Journal of
Political Economy 106(5), 867-896.
Leeper, E. M., 1991, "Equilibria under active and passive monetary and scal policies", Journal of
Monetary Economics, 129-147
Leeper, E. M. and C. Leith, 2016, "Understanding Ination as a Joint Monetary-Fiscal Phenomenon",
Handbook of Macroeconomics, vol 2, Eds. J. Taylor and H. Uhlig
43
Le Grand, F. and Ragot, X. 2016 "Optimal scal policy with heterogeneous agents and aggregate shocks",
mimeo, Sciencespo.
Lippi, F., S. Ragni and N. Trachter 2015. "Optimal monetary policy with heterogeneous money hold-
ings." Journal of Economic Theory 339-368.
Lucas, R. E. Jr. 1987. Models of Business Cycles.Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Lucas R. E. Jr., 1990 "Liquidity and Interest Rates." Journal of Economic Theory 50, 237 - 264.
Lucas, R.E. Jr., 2000. "Ination and Welfare". Econometrica 68, 247-274
Lucas, R. E., Jr. 2003 "Macroeconomic Priorities". American Economic Review 93 (1): 114.
Lucas, R. E., Jr., and N. L. Stokey, 1983, Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in an Economy without
Capital,Journal of Monetary Economics 12, 55-93.
McKay A. and R. Reis, "The Role of Automatic Stabilizers in the U.S. Business Cycle" , Econometrica,
Vol. 84, No. 1, January 2016.
McKay A., Nakamura E. and J. Steinsson 2016, "The power of forward guidance revisited", American
Economic Review.
Mehrling, P., 1995, A Note on the Optimum Quantity of Money.Journal of Mathematical Economics
24(3): 24958
Mersch, Y., 2014, "Monetary policy and economic inequality", Keynote Speech at Corporate Credit
Conference, Zurich
Misra, K. and P. Surico, 2014, "Consumption, Income Changes, and Heterogeneity: Evidence from Two
Fiscal Stimulus Programs"American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 6(4),
Nistico, S., 2015, "Optimal monetary policy and nancial stability in a non-Ricardian economy." Forth-
coming, Journal of the European Economic Association
Nuno, G. and C. Thomas, 2017, "Optimal Monetary Policy with Heterogeneous Agents" Mimeo Bank
of Spain
Patinkin, D. 1956, "Money, Interest and Prices: An Integration of Monetary and Value Theory", Second
edition (1965), MIT Press
Pigou, A.C., 1943. "The Classical Stationary State". Economic Journal 53 (212): 343351
Ragot, X. 2014. "The Case for a Financial Approach to Money Demand." Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, in press.
Ragot, X. 2016. "Money and Capital Accumulation over the Business Cycle." Mimeo.
Ravn, M. and V. Sterk, 2013 Job Uncertainty and Deep Recessions,forthcoming, Journal of Monetary
Economics.
Rocheteau, G., and P. O. Weill 2011: Liquidity in Frictional Asset Markets,Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking, 43, 261282.
Rocheteau, G., P. O. Weill and T. Wong, 2015, "A Tractable Model of Monetary Exchange with Ex-Post
Heterogeneity" Mimeo UC Irvine, UCLA and Bank of Canada
44
Rocheteau, G., P. O. Weill and T. Wong, 2016, "Working through the Distribution: Money in the Short
and Long Run" Mimeo UC Irvine, UCLA and Bank of Canada
Rotemberg, J. J. 1982, Monopolistic Price Adjustment and Aggregate Output. Review of Economic
Studies, 49(4), 517-531
Samuelson, P. 1958. "An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the Social Con-
trivance of Money." Journal of Political Economy, 66, 467.
Scheinkman, J.A. and Weiss, L., 1986, "Borrowing constraints and aggregate economic activity", Econo-
metrica, 54(1), 23-45.
Schmitt-Grohe, S. and M. Uribe, 2004, "Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy under Sticky Prices."
Journal of Economic Theory, February 2004, 114(2): 198-230
Schmitt-Grohe, S. and M. Uribe, 2007, "Optimal Simple and Implementable Monetary and Fiscal Rules."
Journal of Monetary Economics 54, 6
Sheedy, K. D. 2014, "Debt and Incomplete Financial Markets: A Case for Nominal GDP Targeting,"
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 301-373
Shimer, R. 2005. "The cyclical behaviour of equilibrium employment and vacancies." American Eco-
nomic Review 95(1), pp. 2549.
Sterk, V. and S. Tenreyro, 2016, "The Transmission of Monetary Policy through Redistributions and
Durable Purchases" Mimeo UCL and LSE
Surico, P. and R. Trezzi, 2016, "Consumer Spending and Fiscal Consolidation: Evidence from a Housing
Tax Experiment", Mimeo LBS and FRB
Vissing-Jorgensen, A. 2002. "Towards an explanation of the households portfolio choice heterogeneity:
Non nancial income and participation cost structure" NBER Working Paper 8884.
Vissing-Jorgensen, A. 2002. "Limited Asset Market Participation and the Elasticity of Intertemporal
Substitution" Journal of Political Economy.
Wallace, N. 1981. A Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Open-Market Operations, The American Economic
Review, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Jun., 1981), pp. 267-274
Wallace, N. 2014. "Optimal money-creation in pure-currency economies: a conjecture." Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics 129(1), 259-274.
Weill, P. O. 2007 Leaning Against the Wind,Review of Economic Studies, 74(4), 13291354.
Werning, I., 2015, "Incomplete Markets and Aggregate Demand", Mimeo MIT
Woodford, M. 1990. "Public Debt as Private Liquidity" American Economic Review 80(2), pp. 382-88
Woodford, M. 1996. "Controlling the Public Debt: A Requirement for Price Stability?" NBER Working
Paper
Woodford, M. 1998. "Doing Without Money: Controlling Ination in a Post-Monetary World," Review
of Economic Dynamics, 1: 173-219
45
Woodford, M., 2003, Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy, Princeton
University Press
Woodford, M. 2012. "Methods of Policy Accommodation at the Interest-Rate Lower Bound, Jackson
Hole Symposium.
Yellen, J. L. 2014, "Perspectives on Inequality and Opportunity from the Survey of Consumer Finances,"
speech delivered at the Conference on Economic Opportunity and Inequality, Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston, Boston, Mass.
46
A Model Summary
The equations describing our model in the general case are:
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where mCBt+1 is a period t monetary shock (new money created) and At exogenous labor productivity.
The economy resource constraint follows by Walraslaw:
ncPt + (1  n) cNt =

1  
2
2t

Yt + (1  n) 
and can replace (for instance) the P agentsbudget constraint in the system above.
An equilibrium of the economy is a sequence fcPt ; cNt , ct t, xt; ~mPt+1; ~mNt+1; wt; lPt ; Pt ; Nt ;  t; dt; Ytg
satisfying the previous conditions. Assuming that nominal bonds are in zero net supply, we guess-
and-verify the structure of the equilibrium with ~mNt = 0, i.e. non-participating households never
hold money at the end of the period. The conditions for households in the N island not to hold
money, which we check holds in the equilibrium we consider, is:
u0
 
cNt

> E

(1  )u0  cPt+1+ u0  cNt+1 11 + t+1 :
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Consider the conditions for a monetary equilibrium to exist.53 In a monetary steady-state, N
agents do not hold money when 1 +  > , while P agents save in money comparing the gain
to self-insure and the opportunity cost (deation). Thus, we have cP > cN and q > 1. Since
it is costly for P agents to save (the return on money is lower than the discount factor), they
rationally choose not to perfectly self-insure. Using this inequality in the condition (7), we have
u0
 
cN

>

(1  )u0  cP + u0  cN 
1+
: N agents do not hold money at the end of each period,
and ~mN = 0. In steady state, positive money demand requires the restriction that the outside option
not be too good:
c <  = h =
"
1 + n
 
1 +    
 (1  )
 1

  1
!# 1
(28)
Under a Taylor rule, the steady-state ination rate  is determined by the central banks target
and the above condition is parametric. Under Ramsey policy,  is endogenous (it depends, among
other things, on ) and the above condition denes a threshold implicitly.
B Derivations and Proofs
B.1 New Keynesian Phillips curve
The intermediate goods producers solve:
max
Pt(z)
E0
1X
t=0
Qs0;t
"
(1 + )Pt(z)Yt(z) Wtlt(z)  
2

Pt(z)
Pt 1(z)
  1
2
PtYt
#
;
where Qs0;t  ts
 
P0c
P
0 =Ptc
P
t

is the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution of participants
between times 0 and t; and  is a sales subsidy. Firms face demand for their products from two
sources: consumers and rms themselves (in order to pay for the adjustment cost); the demand
function for the output of rms z is Yt(z) = (Pt(z)=Pt)
 " Yt: Substituting this into the prot function,
53Monetary variables are generally not uniquely determined. There always exists an equilibrium of our model where
money has no value. If agents anticipate that money is not traded in the future, they do not accept money today and
the price of money is 0. The reason for the existence of a non-monetary equilibrium is the same as in the monetary
overlapping-generations model of Samuelson (1958). In such a cashless equilibrium, the consumption of N agents is
cN = t in each period. The consumption of P agents is easily determined; this is akin to the standard cashless New
Keynesian model studied in Woodford (2003).
48
the rst-order condition is, after simplifying:
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In a symmetric equilibrium all producers make identical choices (including Pt(z) = Pt); dening net
ination t  (Pt=Pt 1)  1, and noticing that Q0;t+1 = Q0;t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 1 ; equation (29)
becomes:
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B.2 Loglinearized equilibrium conditions
Table 1 outlines the equilibrium conditions loglinearized around an arbitrary steady state, denoting
^t = ln
1+t
1+
and {^t = ln 1+it1+i .
Table 1: Summary of loglinearized equilibrium conditions
Euler P c^Pt = Etc^
P
t+1    1 (^{t   Et^t+1)
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Transfer  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Money growth x^t = m^tott+1   m^tott + ^t
Phillips curve ^t = Et^t+1 + 1+1+2
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
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B.3 Friedman Rule with exible prices
First we show that, as in other monetary economies, the price level is indeterminate at the Friedman
rule. For i = 0, the steady state implies 1+ = ; cP = cN = c andmCB =
 
1   1  n ~mP + (1  n) ~mN :
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There is indeterminacy, even though the real variables c and lp are uniquely determined as the steady-
state rst-best values: the monetary variables ~mP and ~mN must satisfy only one equation, so the
real quantity of money is indeterminate.
Second, we show (in the nonlinear model) convergence to the rst-best allocation (when  = 0)
if 2     >  1   1; the steady-state allocation converges to the rst best when i  ! 0+. In this
case, 1 +   ! +. For 0 < k < 1, dene l^t (k) as the unique solution to the equation:
(n+ (1  n) k)

At

 1
 
l^Pt (k)
 '

= Atl^
p
t (k) + (1  n) t
As the left hand side is decreasing and the right hand side increasing in l^pt , there always exists a
positive solution to the previous equation, whatever At; t > 0. Dene c^Pt (k) as:
c^Pt (k) 
nAtl
p
t + (1  n) t
n+ (1  n) k
For any k < 1, we show that this can reach allocations where cPt = c^
P
t (k), c
N
t = kc
p
t (k) and
lt = l^
P
t (k). When k equals 1, the allocation is exactly the rst-best allocation. When k approaches
1, the allocation can be made arbitrarily close to the rst-best allocation and the nominal interest
rate it tends toward 0+. Take now the model equations from Appendix A, for the case of exible
prices  = 0 and using the money market equilibrium to substitute for ~mPt+1. We proceed by guess
and verify. At any period, the variables mCBt and ~m
P
t are predetermined. As a consequence, assume
that the period t money creation mCBt+1 is determined by the following law:
mCBt+1 = kc^
P
t     
1
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It is easy to show that the allocation cPt = c^
P
t ; c
N
t = kc^
P
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; 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1 + t = 

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 u0  c^Pt 
u0
 
c^Pt 1

is an equilibrium of the model, because it satises all equations. The equilibrium is locally unique,
which we show by standard perturbation methods in a more general case in our companion paper.
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B.4 Optimal Ramsey Policy
The constraints of the Ramsey planner are (these are the model equations, with relevant substitutions
and using the economy resource constraint instead of the P budget constraint):
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When money is created through helicopter-drop, within-period transfers, only the rst three
equations above are constraints for the Ramsey planner.54 Indeed, once cP and  are known, i
follows from the Euler equation for bonds (which hence will not bind as a constraint). Similarly,
once the allocation of the consumption of N and ination have been chosen, the quantity of money
delivering it can be recovered through the following equation:
cNt = t +m
tot
t+1  
  n
1  n
mtott
1 + t
;
where, implicitly, we concentrate only on equilibria where money is used.
The central bank chooses cP ; cN ; lP ;  to maximize the objective dened in the text, subject to the
above system of 3 constraints which we denoted in text by  t and write here explicitly for reference:
max
fcPt ;cNt ;lPt ;tg
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The solution is a system of 4 rst-order conditions and 3 constraints, for 4 variables and 3 co-states
(the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints). The rst-order conditions of the Ramsey problem are
for each variable respectively:
54Whereas with open-market operations, all of the above equations are constraints; we analyze this case and provide
a welfare comparison in the companion paper.
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plus the three constraints with complementary slackness.
A steady-state of the Ramsey problem is dened by:
!1 = 0 or
 
cP
 
=
1  
1+

  
 
cN
 
!2 = 0 or ncPt + (1  n) cNt =

1  
2
2

nlP + (1  n) 
!3 = 0 or  (1 + ) =
"
 (1  )


 
lP
'  
cP
   (1  )
0 = n
 
cP
    !1 (1 +    )  cP   1 + !2n  "

!3
 
lP
'  
cP
 1
0 = (1  n)  cN  + !1 (1  )  cN  1 + !2 (1  n)
0 =  n  lP '   !2 1  
2
2

n  !3'"


 
lP
' 1  
cP

0 = !1
 1  cP   + !2nlP
The Proof of the proposition pertaining to optimal long-run ination is now immediate. With
exible prices  = 0 and optimal subsidy, the only solution to the above system of equations is
perfect insurance through the Friedman Rule:
1 + 

= 1! cP = cN = c
With sticky prices and inelastic labor '!1, the intratemporal optimality condition disappears
from the set of constraints, labor is xed, and it can be easily shown that ination tends to zero
( = 0 solves the above system).
Computing the welfare cost To calculate the welfare cost of ination, we proceed in the standard
way pioneered by Lucas (1987). Denote with an upper-script SS the allocation for the ination rate
SS and no shock. We denote the welfare of an economy where ination is, say , as V : We then
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compute the proportional decrease in consumption for all households in the economy with ination
rate  to equalize the two welfare measures. Formally we compute W to have:
E0V
 = E0
1X
t=0
t
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n
"
u
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)
B.5 Open Market Operations and Ramsey Problem
The general form of money issuance under OM is captured by a "scal rule" that insures that the
intertemporal government equation holds as a constraint for any price level, for example
 t = b
1 + it 1
1 + t
bt   xxt: (33)
This nests the two extreme cases considered in text HD with x = 1 and OM with one-period
repayment. More generally, the coe¢ cient b captures how fast money is issued in the economy once
the OM operation took place. We checked numerically that the value of b delivering the highest
welfare is 1, i.e. one-period repayment, the intuition being the one provided in text. Rigorously,
the Ramsey problem becomes with OM one of choosing the allocation fcPt ; cNt ; lPt ; t;mtott+1; itg to
maximize a Lagrangian similar to the one in (23) but :
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(34)
where !t is the vector of costate, Lagrange multipliers, one for each constraint in  t which include,
other than the constraints with HD, the additional:
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 
cPt

= Et
1 + it
1 + t+1
u0
 
cPt+1

:
B.6 Welfare function and second-order approximation
The second-order approximation technique used is described in detail in Woodford (2003, Chapter
6), Benigno and Woodford (2005, 2012), and Bilbiie (2008) for the case of two agents. A second-order
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approximation of P agentsutility delivers:
UPt   UP = UPc cP

c^Pt +
1  
2
 
c^Pt
2
+ UPL l
P

l^Pt +
1 + '
2

l^Pt
2
=
 
cP
1  
c^Pt +
1  
2
 
c^Pt
2   lP
cP

l^Pt +
1 + '
2

l^Pt
2
where the second equality used SS under subsidy w = 1; UPL =  UPC
For N agents:
UNt   UN =
 
cN
1  
c^Nt +
1  
2
 
c^Nt
2
Aggregating:
Ut   U =
 
cP
   
ncP c^Pt   nlP l^Pt +

cN
cP
 
(1  n) cN c^Nt
!
+ n
 
cP
1  1  
2
 
c^Pt
2   lP
cP
1 + '
2

l^Pt
2
+ (1  n)  cN1  1  
2
 
c^Nt
2
Take the linear term rst:
 
cP
   
cc^t   ll^t +
 
cN
cP
 
  1
!
(1  n) cN c^Nt
!
The economy resource constraint to second order is (denote t = 1  22t ):
c^t = (1  (1  n) c)

at + l^t + ^t

where
^t =   
1  
2
2
t   1
2

1  
2
2
2t
Note that under zero ination the linear term disappears. The squared term captures the welfare
cost of ination.
The linear term becomes hence: 
cP
 
c

^t + at + (q
   1) (1  n)hc^Nt

where we recall q = 1 + (1+)
 1 1
1  ; at the Friedman rule this is unity, and the linear term drops
out. Otherwise, it is larger than 1 and the linear term has a positive coe¢ cient  increasing the
consumption of N closes the inequality gap, providing a rst-order benet.
The quadratic term is (ignoring price dispersion because in quadratic terms it becomes third
or fourth order): 
cP
 
c
2

(1  )

np
 
c^Pt
2
+ (1  n)hq  c^Nt 2  1 + '1  (1  n) c c^2t

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Thus the loss function becomes, rearranging and ignoring terms independent of policy:
L =  cP   c
0@  ^t   (q   1) (1  n)hc^Nt
+ 1
2

np
 
c^Pt
2
+ (1  n)hq  c^Nt 2+ 1+'2 11 (1 n)c c^2t
1A
=
 
cP
 
c
0@  ^t   (q   1) (1  n)hc^Nt + 1 2  c^Nt 2
+ 1
2
np (1  n)hq^2t +

1+'
2
1
1 (1 n)c +
 1
2

c^2t
1A
Adding and subtracting the steady-state ination constant and ignoring all terms independent of
policy, we obtain the loss function
1
2
E0
1X
t=0
t

~
2
t + cc^
2
t + q q^
2
t   

c^Nt +
1  
2
 
c^Nt
2
where the optimal relative weights are:
 =

1  
2
2
; c =    1 + 1 + '
1  (1  n) c
 = 2 (1  n)h (q   1) ; q = (   1)np (1  n)h:
This nests the  = 1 case presented in text. The new relevant terms are q q^2t , which captures the
welfare cost of the volatility of inequality (naturally, this drops out if all agents are identical, n = 0
or n = 1); and the last term that is just a risk correction.
B.7 "New Keynesian cross" model with endogenous N income
We refer the interested reader to Bilbiie (2008, 2017) for more details; here, we outline the equations
that change relative to our baseline model with exogenous income of N. In this model, N agents
work and receive the same market real wage as P agents. For simplicity and to isolate our channel
of insurance through liquidity (rather than di¤erent hours worked), we further assume that hours
worked are pooled by a union and labor is demand-determined thus following Galí et al, 2007 (see
also Ascari et al, 2016 for a setup with a union and sticky wages). The equilibrium implication is
that hours worked by each agent are identical (and hence equal to the aggregate, since total mass is
1):
lNt = l
P
t = lt;
and determined by an aggregate hours schedule that we specify as:
wt =  (lt)
' (ct)
 :
Since lt now replaces  in the expression for utility of N , aggregate welfare will be nu
 
cPt

+
(1  n)u  cNt    1+' l1+'t : The budget constraint for N agents is thus (having imposed asset market
clearing and equilibrium, in particular for money)
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cNt = wtlt    t +
1  
1  n
mtott
1 + t
  TNt
where  t are as before monetary transfers and TNt are taxes used to pay for the sales subsidy given
to rms. As n the benchmark, rmsprots are
dt =

1 +    wt
At
  
2
2t

Yt
where total production is now Yt = Atlt. Assuming that the entire subsidy is nanced via taxes
levied on consumers every period, we specify a process for the distribution of taxes as:
TNt =

1  nYt;
where  is thus the share of the subsidy to rms levied on N households. The economy resource
constraint is ct =
 
1  
2
2t

Yt.
Assuming and optimal subsidy  = ("  1) 1 and  = 0 (our implicit assumption in the baseline
model with exogenous N income) is no longer possible, because the assumption of endogenous labor
would then imply perfect insurance in steady-state (w = 1 ! cN = l = c = cP ). This, in turn,
implies a cashless equilibrium as there is no reason to hold money. We therefore assume for this
part that there is no implicit scal redistribution associated with the supply-side policy:  = 1   n
implying that taxes are uniform TNt = T
P
t = Tt = Yt. We contrast this with the "distorted SS"
case where  = 0:
As for the quadratic approximation to the aggregate welfare function, the main di¤erence is as
follows. Utility of P is unchanged, but utility of N becomes
UNt   UN =
 
cN
1  
cNt +
1  
2
 
cNt
2   lN
cN

lNt +
1 + '
2
 
lNt
2
Aggregating as before and imposing the symmetric labor choice in steady state it can be easily shown
that the linear term boils down to 
cP
 
c
  t + (q   1) (1  n)  hcNt   lNt 
which for our model with equal hours across agents is
 
cP
 
c
  t + (q   1) (1  n)  hcNt   lt.
The quadratic term is di¤erent from the previous only in that the weight on consumption/output
volatility is c = '+ : (this part is identical to Bilbiie, 2008 but that paper focuses on a steady-
state with q = 1). Notice that the expression for q that governs the liquidity-insurance motive (or
distortion) is as before because the self-insurance equation still holds but in order to determine
optimal long-run ination and the consumption share of N we have now (because wl = c):
h =
cN
c
=
wl
c
+

 +
1  
1  n

1
1 + 
m
c
  T
N
c
=
(1 + ) " 1
"
  
1 n
1  
2
2
+

 +
1  
1  n


1 + 
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Aggregate IS curve. Without loss of generality, consider a steady state with zero ination  = 0,
optimal subsidy  = ("  1) 1 and  = 1   n; then we have wl = c and h = 1    + 1 
1 n, and a
loglinear approximation around it:
hc^Nt = w^t + l^t +
1  
1  n
 
m^tott   ^t

+ x^t:
Using labor supply 'l^t = w^t   c^t and production function+resource constraint l^t = c^t which give
w^t = ('+ ) c^t; we rewrite as:
hc^Nt = (1 + '+ ) c^t +
1  
1  n
 
m^tott   ^t

+ x^t:
We replace this and the relevant equations in the Euler equation of participants (12) to obtain:
c^t = Etc^t+1   
 1np
1  (1  n) (1 + '+ ) (^{t   Et^t+1)
+
 (1  )
1  (1  n) (1 + '+ )Et^t+1 +
 (  n)
1  (1  n) (1 + '+ ) x^t  
 (1  n)
1  (1  n) (1 + '+ )Etx^t+1
The amplication of interest rate changes follows the same "New Keynesian cross" logic unveiled
in Bilbiie (2008); the same mechanism also delivers amplication of liquidity changes, and of expected
ination since they both trigger increases in aggregate demand, shifts in labor demand, increases
in the wage, and thus further demand increases for N who consume this wage. One key di¤erence
here with respect to Bilbiie (2017) is that this amplication does not a¤ect the "discounting" (the
coe¢ cient in front of expected consumption) see McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson (2015, 2016) for
the original point of discounting in the aggregate Euler equation under incomplete markets; see also
Werning (2015) for a more general framework that delivers amplication under certain conditions on
cyclicality of income risk and liquidity. The reason why no discounting occurs here is that bonds are
illiquid whereas in those papers and in Bilbiie, 2017 they are liquid.
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